On the 13th, General Schenck received the following dispatch from General Kelley:

"HARPER'S FERRY, June 13, 1863.

"Lieutenant-Colonel CHESEBROUGH:

"A messenger just from Charlestown reports that the enemy attacked Colonel McReynolds at Berryville this morning, and was repulsed, but that McReynolds subsequently fell back, by way of Smithfield, on Winchester, and that, shortly after he left, the rebel cavalry dashed in and burned the stores. If this is reliable, it would seem as if it was not a movement in force, as they in that case would need all the stores they could get. Have you any information from Heintzelman or Stahel of the approach of the rebels?

"B. F. KELLEY,

"Brigadier-General. "

As General Kelley was a Virginian by birth, and lived nearly all his life in that country, and was very extensively acquainted with the inhabitants, and was "well up" in the roads, fords, and passes, his, opinion had great weight, as it was backed up by the represented constant efforts reported by scouts and spies as to the movements of the enemy in reference to the Stuart raid. The first intimation, that General Schenck had of the approach of the rebels in force came from Lee's army at Winchester.

Question. When at Winchester, on the 10th of June, did you examine the works and preparations for defense made by Major-General Milroy? If so, what was your opinion of them and of their capacity against a superior force?

Answer. i thought the works were too extended for General Milroy's force against a superior force made up of cavalry and light artillery. I thought, of course, that he could hold his own, and I so expressed myself. But against a force such as Stonewall Jackson used to take down that Valley, I thought the works would be of small use, and would not justify his remaining.

Question. What did you find to be the condition and disposition of General Milroy's forces with reference to any anticipated attack?

Answer. They were in good condition and spirits as far as I could see in my short visit there. The officers under General Milroy expressed themselves confident of success in case they were attacked-That is, by a cavalry force in this raid, that was anticipated. At a meeting of the officers at headquarters (I don't remember the names of any one excepting General Elliott and Colonel Ely), they all expressed themselves hopeful and satisfied that they could hold their own there.

Question. Can you make any explanation of the difference between yourself and Major-General Schenck in construing General Halleck's telegram of the 11th of June?

Answer. There was no difference between General Schenck and myself, in reference to our construction of that telegram. I saw fit to use it as an order for an immediate evacuation, for the following reasons: I had been upon the ground, and satisfied myself that, if the raid did come off, General Milroy ought not to be at Winchester. The forces at Martinsburg I found demoralized through the bad conduct of its colonel, Smith, One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio, so that the stores their and the force itself could have easily been captured. I observed the General Halleck's telegram was subsequent to the fight at Beverly Ford, which had been represented through the press as a victory on our part and a defeat of the Stuart raid, and I thought the tone of it indicated that it was not a victory, and that the raid might still be anticipated at any moment. it will be observed in my first telegram to General Milroy, that I say: "This, from General Halleck, must be considered an order, and executed accordingly. " General Schenck, on the other hand, having found General Milroy at Winchester when he took command of the department, and having been in continual consultation with the General-in-Chief. as to his manner of treating that post, took this telegram, as he had the others, as instructing him to remove General Milroy back to Harper's Ferry when satisfied that he was in danger. I will say here that General Schenck had proposed to the General-in-Chief. to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by a line of posts running from the Potomac, through Leesburg, Snicker's Gap, Winchester, and Romney, to New Creek, and to take the troops in a great measure away from the line of the railway. That