WASHINGTON,, D. C., April 30, 1863 .

Major-General SCHENCK, Baltimore: If you want more troops in the west and Harper's Ferry, why do you leave so large a force at Winchester? As I have often repeated to you verbally and writing, that is no place to fight a battle . it is merely an outpost, which should not be exposed to an attack in force .

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief -

WASHINGTON,, D. C., May 2, 1863.

Major-General SCHENCK, Baltimore:

* * * * * * *

There is every probability against any force of the enemy in front of Milroy ; he must be on another stampede.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief. . -

WASHINGTON,, D. C., May 8, 1863 .

Major-General SCHENCK, Baltimore:

I have just learned that Elliott's cavalry has been sent to Woodstock and Edinburgh . They are of no possible use there, excepting to be captured . You will maintain only a small force at Winchester, as an outpost, and employ the remainder of Milroy's troops for the protection of the railroad and operations against the enemy in Western Virginia . For Milroy to attempt operations up the Shenandoah at the present time is utter madness.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief

WASHINGTON,, D. C., May 29, 1863.

Major-General SCHENCK, Baltimore:

There are reasons why your forces at Harper's Ferry, in the Shenandoah Valley, and Western Virginia should be on the alert, and prepared for an attack .

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief

WASHINGTON,, D. C., June 8, 1863

Major-General SCHENCK, Baltimore:

The indications are that the enemy is massing about 12, 000 cavalry and artillery in Culpeper County, for a raid . Deserters say the men have been given to understand that it is to be a long and desperate one . I can only repeat the recommendation so often made to you, to mass your troops more in convenient places for rapid and concerted operations, holding railroad bridges only, with small detachments in block-houses, and exposing no large force in advanced positions, where they are liable to be cut off . We probably shall not know