roundedd the post, and during the day our troops were engaged with them in constant skirmishing, especially in the direction of the Martinsburg and Berryville roads. In the evening, the main attack was made from the direction of the Romney road . A large force was precipitated upon the rifle-pits, which were carried . The force which occupied them, however, was enabled to retire with but slight loss, in retreat being covered by the guns of the forts . By night, the works were closely invested in front, the sentinels of the enemy being within about 200 yards of the main fort . About midnight, General Milroy called a council of war of the brigade commanders, and an evacuation was determined upon . IV. The evacuation. It was fully agreed in the council of war that it was necessary to evacuate the post . Our forces were surrounded ; they had rations for but one day, and their artillery ammunition was nearly expended . The telegraph wires had been cut ; all communication between them and Harper's Ferry was at an end, and there appeared no probability of their being relieved . The only question with the council of was as to the proper road by which to retreat . All excepting Colonel McReynolds appear to have agreed that the Martinsburg road was to be preferred ; and though there is some difference of opinion among the officers whose testimony in contained in the record as to this point, yet the majority (including the Captain Powell, the chief engineer of General Milroy's staff ; who may be deemed and expert)agree that the determination of the council was the most prudent . Colonel McReynolds would have taken the Berryville, had been occupied by the roads, as well as the town of Berryville, had been occupied by the enemy in considerable force on the 13th, and it was likely that a larger body would have been encountered on this road than was actually met on the road selected for the retreat . The outpost of the enemy being so near the works, the evacuation was ordered to be made with as a little noise as possible . Nothing on wheels was allowed to be taken . About two hundred wagons were left, and twenty- four guns in all were spiked and abandoned . About 200. 000 rounds of small-arms ammunition was also abandoned, but the remaining artillery ammunition, about 20 rounds to a gun, was mostly destroyed . The amount of quartermaster's stores left behind was but small . The sick, wounded, &c., remained with the surgeons in the hospital . About 2 o; clock in the morning of the 15th, the evacuation commenced, the forces marching from the forts in the order of the brigades . Some 800 artillery, and teams horses, mounted by teamsters, non-combatants, and invalids, brought up the rear of the column . A question is raised in the testimony whether the light batteries, commanded by Captains Carlin and Alexander, could have been brought off with safety, but it is agreed by nearly all the witnesses that brought the batteries would have been very useful in the retreat in the engagement of the 15th, yet their removal would have occasioned so much noise as probably to have attracted the attention of the enemy in front, and advised them of the movement, and, further, that the roughness of the road might have seriously delayed the artillery, and thus endangered the march of the column . Colonel McReynolds thinks he could have got off his battery (Alexander's) by the Berryville road, but, as has already been stated, this road was,

13 R R -VOL XXVII, PT II