skirmishers, equal almost, if not fully, to my main line, and using their artillery, to dislodge them from their position. On the 3d, my orders were general, and the same as those of the day before, and accordingly, when the heavy cannonade indicated that another attack was made from the right wing of our army, we were on the lookout for another favorable opportunity to co-operate. When the sound of musketry was heard, it became apparent that the enemy in our front was much excited. The favorable opportunity seemed to me close at hand. I sent word to Lieutenant-General Ewell by Major [H. A.] Whiting, of my staff, that in a few moments I should attack, and immediately had my handful of men, under Doles, Iverson, and Ramseur, prepared for the onset; but in less than five minutes after Major Whiting's departure, before the troops on my immediate right had made any advance or showed any preparation therefor, and just as the order forward was about to be given to my line, it was announced, and was apparent to me, that the attack had already failed. This attack was accompanied, preceded, and succeeded by the fiercest and grandest cannonade I have ever witnessed. My troops lay about half way between the artillery of the Second Corps and that of the enemy on Cemetery Hill, and directly under the line of fire of fully 100 guns, a most trying position even when the opposing artillerists

confined their attention to each other, and one which became fearfully so when both parties, as they did at short intervals, dropped shells in their midst, while the sharpshooters were constant and skillful in their attentions. They underwent this terrible trial not only without murmuring or faltering, but with great cheerfulness and with the utmost coolness. It is proper to mention that during the night of the 2nd and on the 3rd my troops did not occupy and portion of the town excepting that still held by the sharpshooters of the Alabama brigade, under that promising young officers, Major [Eugene] Blackford, of the Fifth Alabama. These sharpshooters, together with those of Doles', Iverson's, and Ramseur's brigades, annoyed the enemy's artillery infantry constantly during the period of our occupation of the town, and acted with rare and praiseworthy gallantry. During the night of the 3d, my division fell back to the ridge which had been wrested from the enemy in the first day's attack, and, being reunited, was posted so that the railroad divided it about equally. Expecting to give battle in this position, it was strengthened early on the morning of the 4th. We were not disturbed, however, in the least during the day-in fact, the enemy exhibited so small a force, entered the town, and followed us at so late an hour, that it was generally believed he had retreated. During the day of the 4th, all the wounded who could walk or be transported in wagons and ambulances were sent to the rear (many, as it turned out, to be captured or sacrificed in the effort to escape the enemy's cavalry), but nearly one-half of them, say about 760, were left in the hands of the enemy. This painful result was, of course, unavoidable. Four surgeons, 6 assistants, 3 hospital stewards, and 94 attendants were left to attend to the wounded, and with them ten day's supply of such food and medicines as were needed. This was all we could do for them. Subsequent to the departure of the wounded, Iverson was detached with his brigade as a guard for the train, but unfortunately too late