co-operate at Brown's Ferry, as well as Rankin's Ferry. Inform yourself with regard to the roads from Rankin's Ferry,via. Whiteside's, to Brown's Ferry. The object of the movement is to hold the road and gain possession of the river as far as Brown's Ferry.

By command of Major-General Thomas:

J. J. REYNOLDS,

Major-General, and Chief of Staff.

STEVENSON, October 24, 1863-6.10 p.m.

Colonel GODDARD,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

Orders received for First Division, Twelfth Corps, to remain. The failure of the telegraph last evening caused delay in informing General Granger of the change. The rear of the division of the Twelfth Corps, ordered to concentrate at Bridgeport, passed Decherd this a.m. Distance, 30 miles marching, in consequence of the interruption of the railroad. One regiment of the Eleventh Corps will be ordered to remain at Battle Creek. The rear (100 wagons) of the train furnished the Eleventh Corps, leaving Nashville on the 12th instant, arrived here to-day. From this you can judge of the roads. I should like to have a small cavalry force attached to this command that crosses the river; have none now.

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General.

STEVENSON, October 24, 1863-7.15 p.m.

Major-General REYNOLDS:

I am informed by people familiar with country on south side of Tennessee River, that the direct route from Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry is not practicable for wagons, and in order to take artillery to that point it will be necessary to take the road to within two miles of Trenton, and from there turn down Lookout Creek Valley; that there are several bridle paths leading from the crest of Lookout Mountain into the valley between Trenton and the river, and that infantry can descend the north slope of Lookout at many points. My informants are men who have grazed their stock on Lookout Mountain. From the official map furnished me, there appears to be an ascent to the south of what is called Hotel Institute. If this is the case, from my present knowledge of the means at hand at Chattanooga to prevent enemy's infantry ascending the mountain from the south side, I can see no reason for his not detaching two-thirds of his force to thwart the execution of their purposed object. I may be incorrect in my views of this movement from the limited opportunity I have had in comparison with others to gain correct information, and only state the foregoing with the hope that I may be in error.

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General.