creek of that name, until within a mile or more of its mouth, where the Brown's Ferry road leaves it to the left. This valley is, perhaps, 2 miles in width, and completely overlooked by the lofty crests of Lookout and Raccoon Mountains. All the movements and dispositions of troops are easily descried from the heights of either, while the valley itself affords abundant opportunity for concealment from the observation of those within. Another prominent feature in Lookout Valley requires mention to a clear perception of its topography and a correct understanding of our operations. This is a succession of hills 200 or 300 feet high, with precipitous timbered slopes and narrow crests, which penetrate 3 miles up the valley and divide it as far as they go nearly in its center. There are five or six of them in number, almost isolated, though in a direct line on the left bank of Lookout Creek, with the railroad passing between the two summits at the extreme of the range; and still lower down the valley the road bears off to Chattanooga, about 2 miles distant, through these hills, while the road to Brown's Ferry continues along the west base to the Tennessee River.

The enemy held possession of these hills, as, indeed, of all the country through which we had passed after crossing at Bridgeport. They had also batteries planted on Lookout Mountain, overlooking them. On the opposite side of the valley is Raccoon Range, and about 3 miles up is the gorge through it which leads to what is called Kelley's Ferry, 3 miles distant. As it was proposed to make this our new line of communication with Chattanooga, my instructions required me, if practicable, to gain possession of and to hold it. As the gorge debouches into Lookout Valley the road forks, one leading to Wauhatchie and up the valley, the other to Chattanooga, and down the valley. It was known that a portion of Longstreet's command was in the valley, it is presumed in part for convenience in supplying themselves with rations and forage, but mainly for his sharpshooters to annoy our communications on the north side of the Tennessee and compel our trains to make long detours, over execrable roads, in their transit from Chattanooga to our depots at Stevenson. From its proximity to the enemy's line of investment around Chattanooga, and his facilities for detaching heavily from his masses, it was apprehended that the enemy would make unusual efforts to prevent the transfer of its possession, as a failure on our part to establish new communications involved a fact of no less magnitude than the necessity for the early evacuation of Chattanooga, with the abandonment of much our artillery and trains.

To return to the column; it pushed on down the valley until arrested by an irregular fire of musketry proceeding from the hill next the railroad as it passes through the central ridge before described. As it was densely covered with forest, we had no means of ascertaining the number of the enemy, except by feeling. Howard's corps being in the advance, he was directed to throw a brigade to the right to turn the position, and a regiment, supported by the balance of another brigade, to the left for the same purpose. No sooner had the brigade on the right deployed than the enemy took to his legs and fled across the creek, burning the railroad bridge in his flight. We lost a few men here, as well as from the shelling we received from the batteries on Lookout Mountain, whenever our column was exposed to them. The central ridge of hills afforded partial cover from the batteries; these, however, caused no serious interruption in the