[CHAP. XLIII.

tions. The difference, however, is not very material, as the manner in which I executed the order, answered even General Hooker's version of the story. The troops were soon in motion, and even General Hooker admits that the turning out of the troops was splendid. As soon as the alarm was given and before the order to march had reached me, I had send one of my aides to my Second and Third Brigades, to bring the columns from the camps down toward the road. Then, leaving my chief of staff behind for the purpose of superintending the movement of the Second and Third Brigades, which were ordered to follow the First, I placed myself at the head of Tyndale's column, and directed its march toward the firing. It is proved that the orders I left to my chief of staff to transmit were correctly given, first by Captain Greenhut, assistant adjutant-general of the Third Brigade, who received them, and then by Lieutenant Klutsch, who heard them communicated to he commander of the Second Brigade.

These orders were not only correctly given, but also correctly executed for it is proved that the troops marched without delay and in the right direction, following the advance. No military man will pretend that these orders were not answering the object and fitting the circumstances. The ground over which, I had to march was not reconnoitered outside of the road. The only indication we had of the intentions of the enemy was the firing at Wauhatchie. If the attack on Geary was serious, it was not only possible but probable, that the enemy occupied some position in the valley in order to protect their rear. This would have been correct, and was therefore probable. Whether we would meet them, where, and in what strength, we had to find out; and, in order to find it out, I placed myself at the head of the advance. To give, in this state of absolute uncertainty, special instructions to brigades marching in the rear to do this or to do that, would have been absurd. Their part in the action depended upon circumstances, and the circumstances had first to be ascertained. My orders covered this case completely. According to them, my brigades were to be at hand, to be used as circumstances would demand, and the testimony shows clearly enough that they would have been and hand had not other agencies interfered. Relying upon their following me, I pushed forward skirmishers in advance. The evidence shows that on the ground, as it then was, troops could not be moved with more speed. When opposite the hill, now know as Smith's Hill, the head of the column received a volley from the left.

It was on this occasion that one of my aides, of whom the testimony speaks, was wounded by my side. The head of the column stopped a moment, fired a few shots in return, and upon the order to cease firing, pushed on again toward Wauhatchie. Meanwhile, the firing on Smith's Hill became lively; it was evident that our troops were engaged with the enemy on that spot. At the same time, the firing near Geary's camp died gradually away.

General Howard, who had been with my column, and left if not long before we reached the foot of the hill afterward known as Tyndale's, sent me word through Captain Stinson, one of his aides, that he desired me to move forward as rapidly as possible. Soon afterward the skirmishers became entangled in a boggy thicket, which was impenetrable for troops. We had left the road at a place a few rods behind, where it makes a slight turn, and moved forward on a bee-line. The skirmishers were recalled, and after a stoppage of a