[CHAP. XLIII.

ard's case; it is exactly in this way that he came to stop Hecker, and General Hooker confirmed his action by subsequent instructions of his own. It is not only probable, but almost certain (at least it is my firm belief) that the Second Brigade, which preceded Hecker's, was stopped in a similar manner. General Hooker's own instructions to Colonel Hecker to be prepared for a change of front can be explained upon no other theory but that he was expecting an attack. And the staff officers no doubt acted upon the inspirations of their chief. All this was perfectly natural. There is nothing surprising in it. But it was not natural that General Hooker should have expected the same troops which were held at the cross-roads under his instructions, and with his knowledge, should at the same time march to the relief of Geary. And it is most unnatural that he should in his report charge a lack of courage and valor upon commanders and troops because they stood still where he, with his own instructions and under his own eyes, had held them.

It is true General Hooker's own testimony, although by some unguarded admissions the theory upon which I explain these occurrences, partly ignores, partly contradicts some of the facts upon which this reasoning is founded. I would not subject his depositions on oath to a scrutiny were it not a duty I owe to myself and I owe to my companions. That duty I perform with regret and reluctance, for when I look upon General Hooker's sworn testimony as it stands there, unsupported by any other evidence, in conflict with the testimony of almost every other witness, his own aides included, in conflict even with itself, it is to me a subject of painful contemplation. As he informs us, Colonel Hecker told him that he was in his position by order of General Howard. Colonel Hecker asseverates that he said Major Howard, but General Hecker have misunderstood him. This misunderstanding, however, is of very little moment. General Hooker goes on to tell us that he may have said to Colonel Hecker to wait there for further orders from General Howard. General Hooker tells us also that he had advised General Howard of the orders given to me to double-quick my division to the relief of Geary. And then he supposed that General Howard, after having been advised of that order, had stopped the troops on the way. Indeed, does General Hooker not know that General Howard was my immediate commander, and that his orders were superior to mine? If General Hooker really was under the impression that General Howard had stopped the troops which, by my orders, were marching toward Geary, and that these troops, after having been so stopped by General Howard, were left waiting for General Howard's Hooker's impression, how in the name of common sense then could he blame me or my troops for a delay, which, in his opinion, was owing to the orders, or to a neglect of General Howard, my commander?

Either General Hooker did not believe that General Howard had ordered these troops to stop, or, by blaming me and my command, he committed the most unaccountable injustice, an injustice for which even the cheap pretense of a misapprehension cannot serve as an excuse. No; this will not answer. It is well enough established that General Howard gave no orders to halt. He had, indeed, a far different idea of a double-quick movement. Instead of halting troops on the way, troops whose commanders were impatient to get on, he was with me and General Tyndale at the head of the column