main with my troops where I was. It is confirmed by his letter to Brigadier-General Whipple. I do not speak of impression, nor do the witnesses who accompanied me during that night. Our minds were not troubled; the events of that night are present at the mind as if it had been an hour ago. There we halted, and the fire at Geary's was over shortly after we were halted, as above exposed. There we halted in the presence of Major-General Hooker. Under all circumstances he was informed of the presence of my brigade, and under his instructions. There we halted a long time under the very eyes of the commander-in-chief. Why, if Geary was in peril, were not the troops nearest at hand pushed forward? Major-General Hooker halted in front of Second Brigade. I had pointed it out to him; this brigade had turned out from us to the left toward the hill, halting in an open field. Somebody must have halted this brigade. Why was not this brigade pushed forward? The commander-in-chief halting in front of it, is it possible that no inquiry should have been made, what troops there are halting at a short distance from the commander-in-chief at a time when there were other troops in peril? General Hooker knew during the time that Tyndale's [First] brigade took and occupied the hill in front; he had seen and spoken with the commander of Third Brigade.

Major-General Hooker says that I had informed him that it was halted by an order of Major-General Howard. This is incorrect. I informed him that I received the order from Major Howard. All the persons surrounding us heard the same. I did not even ask Major Howard who had issued the order. I obeyed and executed it without delay. During an attack of the enemy the battle-field is not the place for asking questions about the orders. Major Howard was a well-known aide-de-camp. He himself states, and it is proved, that he was with General Hooker, and that General Hooker himself, or Major-General Butterfield, caused the halting of the troops, and the evidence is before the Court that Major-General Schurz was informed of the halting of his two remaining brigades. How could this, my brigade, have pushed forward to Geary, as I had not received any orders in that regard? How can I be blamed for not executing orders never given to me, or contrary to orders received?

Let us suppose the brigade had halted by orders of Major-General Howard, or without orders, was it not the duty of the commander-in-chief, who had a long time for reflection, to push them forward and correct any fault or mistake committed by his subordinate commanders when a real danger existed, when another body of troops was in peril? The explanation of all the circumstances is near at had. A large terrain, a distance of over 2, nearly 3, miles, lay between the camp of the Eleventh Corps and the camp of General Geary, unoccupied by troops. Three debouches from the enemy's camp at Lookout led to this terrain on the sides of Smith's and Tyndale's Hills. When the night attack began it was clear that the enemy had passed out of those debouches. The line to Brown's Ferry to the rear of Chattanooga was in danger. It was necessary to stop the march of the troops to protect this line. The fire from the hill and the gap indicated clearly the intention of the enemy. Words to that effect must have been uttered by the commander-in-chief. Major Howard hears it; communicates it to the troops. Major-General Hooker is informed of this, and he does not disapprove the movement. On the contrary, he gives instructions for certain emergencies to the commander of Third Brigade. How can any