ley beyond. The section of howitzers commanded by Lieutenant Brown opened upon it, throwing it into confusion and compelling it temporarily to retire. The enemy was evidently much astonished at the presence of the artillery, and its fire was very effective. When a second advance in additional force was made, and upon information that the enemy was crossing at another point above them, the two regiments [Fourth and Fifteenth Alabama], which had now succeeded in collecting their pickets, with the artillery retired slowly toward Lookout Mountain. I met them with the remainder of the brigade at Lookout Creek, where I placed the command in line to await any farther advance. The enemy, however, did not advance as far as the creek, but continued to strengthen his position on the hill above Brown's Ferry, and commenced the construction of a pontoon bridge half a mile above the ferry, which was completed before noon.

In this affair we lost 6 men killed and 14 wounded. Among the latter was Colonel W. C. Oates, the gallant and efficient commander of the Fifteenth Alabama Regiment. One of the wounded was left in the hands of the enemy too severely injured to be removed.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th, I learned from my scouts that a considerable force of the enemy was moving from Shellmound in the direction of Chattanooga, and that this force was then in 8 or 10 miles of my position on Lookout Creek. I ascertained further that a force of cavalry was advancing from Kelley's Ferry, where a bridge had been thrown across the river. This information was communicated to the brigadier-general commanding the division, with my views as to the object of the movement. My views, as thus communicated, were that it was probably not the intention of the enemy to attack Lookout Mountain at present, but to take possession of the railroad as far as the Trenton junction, 2 miles from the foot of Lookout Mountain, and by holding Lookout Valley to obtain supplies by running wagon trains from the junction across the bridge above Brown's Ferry to Chattanooga. This has since been done.

About noon on the 28th, I was notified by cavalry scouts and the signal post on Lookout that a heavy column of the enemy was approaching my position from the direction of Shellmound. Soon afterward his skirmishers appeared in front. They were checked for a time by my skirmishers, posted so as to command the intersection of the railroad with the wagon road leading from Chattanooga toward Bridgeport. My riflemen were soon forced, however, to abandon this position and take up the line of Lookout Creek. The enemy on crossing the railroad took the road leading to Brown's Ferry, [being] fired upon as he passed by my section of howitzers and the batteries on Lookout Point. During the afternoon 5,000 or 6,000 men must have passed toward my right.

Late in the afternoon I received a note from Lieutenant-General Longstreet directing me to cross the lower bridge over Lookout Creek, near its mouth, at dark, and advance cautiously until I commanded the Brown's Ferry road at its junction with the road leading across the lower bridge to Chattanooga; to blockade that road and capture any trains that might attempt to pass. This junction I should estimate to be about a mile from the bridge.

Just before night I met Brigadier-General Jenkins, commanding division, who informed me that three other brigades of the division were then moving across the mountain with the view of crossing Lookout Creek to cut off the enemy's trains and capture the rear

15 R R-VOL XXXI, PT I