when finally abandoned is so situated as to allow ready access to all the roads except the one leading through Kingston. In short, he can concentrate his forces here more rapidly, supply them more easily, defend himself quite as successfully, and finally, if it comes to the worst, he can carry off his command in better condition, and by routes which, although longer, would be safe, and ultimately enable him to move wherever you might direct.

In case he is compelled to relinquish Knoxville, after destroying everything that could help the enemy, he would prefer to go to Morristown and Bean's Station. He thinks he could maintain those positions against any force that could be sent against him; they being admirably situated with reference to the gaps, would enable him to keep up communication in that direction, to prevent the repair of railroad, and still allow him to forage much of the country to the south and eastward. There being plenty of mills, he could still be able to supply himself in a degree with bread from the country, and use his transportation for hauling sugar, coffee, and salt. In anticipation of this step he could at once set to work fortifying these places as strongly as possible from Knoxville.

If you should direct it, he could move when necessary by Clinton, Winter's Gap, and Morganton either to Carthage or McMinnville. But in this event his live stock, coming by way of the gaps, together with the main part of the cavalry should be turned back into Kentucky, to be disposed of afterward as necessity might demand.

The general's idea of Kingston is that, although a point of considerable natural strength, and, if well supplied, of strategic importance, it is almost entirely out of the question now either as a point of his line of retreat or as one from which he could exercise a controlling influence over East Tennessee. The country about it is poor, the Clinch and Emory River regions having been exhausted of supplies by his previous operations.

If his whole force were concentrated there, he could not possibly take with him more than seven days' supply. the railroad would at once fall into the enemy's hands, and could be repaired at leisure. They would also get Knoxville, all the mills, and nearly the entire productive region of East Tennessee. This would necessarily be the case, for, with a few more [days of] good weather, the Holston could be forded at any place south of Knoxville, and, in addition, bridges might be easily constructed so as to cross either it or the Tennessee. It is reported now that the rebels are building a pontoon bridge upon Pond Creek, and that they are watching every ford and ferry from the foot of the mountain to Kingston with the greatest care. It seems entirely practicable for the enemy to cross if he desires it, and that before Burnside's forces could be concentrated at any point; hence the general argues that if it becomes necessary to leave East Tennessee, and he were to be ordered to do it by way of Kingston, the enemy could precipitate that necessity, in spite of all activity, before our forces could possibly be disposed to prevent it or to effect their retreat. In this event his forces would either be beaten in detail or be compelled to go at once to Kingston, where they cannot feed themselves and are still far from a junction with Thomas.

This is the case considered defensively only, but if the good weather continues it will become desirable to concentrate a force sufficient to anticipate the enemy in offensive operations, and thereby prevent him from gaining even the temporary advantages to be derived from compelling Burnside to adopt either of the plans alluded to above.