On the 19th of October, I received directions to report my operations to Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding Division of the Mississippi, and I accordingly reported to him a statement of the situation and condition of my forces. On the 19th, I sent a flag of truce through Colonel Wolford's lines, whose headquarters were at Philadelphia, on the south side of the Holston. The enemy's cavalry took advantage of this flag and made an attack upon him, capturing some 300 or 400 men and some mountain howitzers which he had with his command.

On the 28th, the force at Loudon was crossed to the north side of the river, and the pontoon bridge taken up and transported to Knoxville, at which point it was thrown across the Holston, and proved of immense service to us during the siege. The indications at this time were that Bragg was sending a considerable force against us. I re-enforced Kingston with Colonel Mott's brigade of infantry, left General White with his command at Loudon, and posted General Potter, with the Ninth Corps, at Lenoir's. All the available cavalry force was thrown on the south side of the Holston, with instructions to guard down to the Little Tennessee River, and General Potter was instructed to build a pontoon bridge over the Holston just above the mouth of the Little Tennessee, which bridge was constructed with great expedition, under superintendence of Colonel O. E. Babcock. The object of this bridge was to enable our force on either side of the river to communicate. Some correspondence passed between Generals Grant, Halleck, and myself as to the proper points to be held in East Tennessee, which resulted in Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and Colonel Wilson, of General Grant's staff, visiting my headquarters, by order of General Grant. I gave them my reasons in full for desiring to hold Knoxville in preference to Kingston. They concurred with me in that view, and we all agreed that it would be proper to recommend the holding of both places, if possible, but certainly Knoxville.

At this time it was known definitely that Longstreet was moving against us. Those gentlemen left my headquarters on the morning of the 14th. On their return I accompanied them to Lenoir's, and soon after parting with them at that place, we were engaged with Longstreet's advance. General Parke was left in command at Knoxville, with a portion of the Twenty-third Corps. General Sanders, with the cavalry, was at the south side of the Holston. The enemy endeavored to seize the heights on the south side of the river commanding the town, but was foiled in his attempts by the forces under General Parke. Longstreet was building a bridge at Huff's Ferry, just below Loudon, and had thrown a force across in advance of the main body. I directed Generals Potter and White to move in direction of Huff's Ferry and drive in the advance, Chapin's brigade, of General White's command, leading. Skirmishing continued during the entire day, but our forces constantly advanced, and by night had driven the enemy back near to his bridge-head. Knowing the purposes of General Grant as I did, I decided that he could be better served by driving Longstreet farther away from Bragg than by checking him at the river, and I accordingly decided to withdraw my forces and retreat leisurely toward Knoxville, and soon after daylight on the 15th the whole command was on the road. Skirmishing continued during the day, the enemy following us as we retreated. That night [the 15th] we encamped at Lenoir's without serious molestation. About 10 p.m. the enemy made a dash on our lines, but

18 R R-VOL XXXI, PT I