ridges spring up. This last division is known as Mabry's Hill, and is the highest ground by some 20 feet to be found on the north side of the river within cannon range of Knoxville.

Commencing at Third Creek and going eastward, these tables may be numbered 1,2,3, and 4. A succession of ridges, all parallel to the one alluded to above, are found at short distances apart as one goes back from the river, the most important of which is at an average distance of 1 mile from the one Knoxville is situated upon, and is that which the enemy occupied. As near as can be ascertained by a pocket level, its elevation is exactly that of table No. 1 at its highest point. In selecting lines it was only my opinion that tables Nos. 1,2,3, and 4 should be occupied. In this opinion the general commanding concurred, except regarding No. 4. It was a question whether it was most prudent, with our small force, to attempt to occupy No. 4. or to limit our occupation in force to Nos. 1,2, and 3, simply holding No. 4 with a strong outpost. It seemed to me that we could (as we did) construct lines on No. 4 and also on No. 3, those on No. 4. to be thrown so far to the front that they could not be made available against us in event of their capture by the and to be held by us with obstinacy, only leaving them when absolutely compelled to do so, in which case the lines on No. 3. would form our defense, and the enemy, after a stubborn fight, in which he would have suffered, would only have occupied a position, from which, in the former case, it would have been necessary to dislodge a mere outpost. In other words, after crippling him all we could in his successful assault upon No. 4, we would still have just as good a defense as if we had occupied No. 3 in the first place. But, on the other hand, by extending our lines to include No. 4, we made them weak in numbers at any one point, and we were consequently exposed to greater danger of being successfully assaulted along our whole position. This difficulty was partially obviated by the successful construction of a dam across First Creek, by which an impassable water obstacle of three-quarters of a mile in length was made immediately in front of and parallel to the crest of No. 3, which enabled us to greatly weaken our numbers (of infantry) on that part of the line. The general commanding yielded to my opinion, and all the foregoing positions were occupied as follows: On No. 1, Forts Sanders and Byington and Batteries Noble and Zoellner; on No. 2, Fort Comstock and Batteries Galpin, Wiltsie, and Billingsley; on No. 3, Fort Huntington Smith and Batteries Clifton Lee, Fearns, and Stearman; on No. 4, Fort Hill. All our works were connected by a continuous line of

rifle-trenches. Between the ridge occupied by ourselves and that occupied by the enemy the valley varied in width, but its average breadth was in the neighborhood of 1 mile. It was almost entirely cleared of timber, and was at every point under the fire of our artillery. A direct advance over it would have been made only with serious loss. This would have been particularly the case in front of No. 4, where the valley widened to 1 1/2 miles and was without timber or cover of any kind for troops. On the south side of the river the ground rises into a series of prominent points, the highest of which is about 350 feet, and is directly opposite Knoxville, the prolongation of Gay street passing directly over it. These knobs formed a range quite close to the river bank, with a wide valley beyond them. It was all important to us that at least three of these knobs should be held. We actually held four of them, commencing with the first hill east of the Louisville road and counting down the