The general commanding yielded to my opinions, and all the foregoing positions were occupied as follows:

On No. 1, Forts Sanders and Byington, and Batteries Noble and Zoellner.

On No. 2, Fort Comstock and Batteries Galpin, Wiltise, and Billingsley.

On No. 3, Forth Huntington Smith and Batteries Clifton Lee, Fearns, and Stearman.

On No. 4, Fort Hill.

All our works were connected by a continuous line of

rifle-trenches. Between the ridge occupied by ourselves and that occupied by the enemy the valley varied in width, but its average breadth was in the neighborhood of 1 mile. It was almost entirely cleared of timber, and was at every point under the fire of our artillery.

A direct advance over it would have been made only with severe loss. This would have been particularly the case in front of No. 4, where the valley increases in width to 1 1/2 miles, and was without timber or cover of any kind for troops.

On the south side of the river the ground rises into a series of prominent points, the highest of which is about 360 feet, and is directly opposite Knoxville; the prolongation of Gay street passes directly over it. These knobs formed a range quite close to the river bank, with a wide valley beyond them. It was all important to us that at least three of these knobs should be held. We actually held four of them, commencing with the first hill east of the Sevierville road, and counting down the river.

As already stated, the enemy made several attempts to get possession of these heights, the first being made on Sunday, November 15, by a heavy force of cavalry, under the command of Wheeler, which was repulsed by Sanders' division of cavalry, which had been guarding the right bank of the Little Tennessee, and had gradually fallen back before Wheeler's heavier force. Sanders was assisted by Cameron's brigade of infantry.

From these heights an artillery fire can be delivered in front of each flank of the lines on the north side of the river.

Commencing with the most easterly hill (which we called "Sevierville Hill"), and numbering them 1,2,3, and 4, they were occupied by us follows:

On No. 1, only rifle-trenches.

On No. 2, Fort Stanley.

On No. 3, Fort Dickerson.

On No. 4, Fort Higley.

Nos.1 and 2 were connected by rifle-trenches, while Nos.3 and 4, though not connected, each was well provided with rifle-trenches to cover the infantry supports of the batteries.

With sufficient time, this disposition could be very much improved, by making the several forts of such a character (building

bomb-proofs for stores and cisterns for water) that each would be self-reliant.

For the map* which accompanies this report, I am indebted to

Sub-Assistant Rockwell and Aide Talcott, of the U. S. Coast Survey.

The delay in the report was caused by my desire to await the completion of the map, without which it would be crude enough.

The accompanying photographic views are intended to illustrate still further the locality rendered historical by the siege of Knoxville.

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*To appear in the Atlas.

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