commenced fortifying Bull's Gap. The enemy were reported by loyal Tennessee to be in force at and below Kingsport, Greeneville, and Newport; and from the 6th to the 17th my operations were confined to scouting in those directions, cavalry skirmishers, and foraging, on which we were, men and animals, mainly dependent for food.

On Lonstreet's appearance opposite Loudon, Hoskins's brigade was ordered to Knoxville. Shackelford had previously been detached to the same point to assume command of the cavalry Corps. My command now consisted of the Indiana six-months' regiments, the batteries already mentioned, a skeleton regiment of North Carolina recruits, and Graham's and Garrard's brigades of cavalry, forming a division, under Colonel Foster. At Morristown was the Thirty-second Kentucky Infantry, the Eleventh Michigan Battery, and a battalion of mounted Tennesseeans, under Lieutenant-Colonel Davis. At Mossy Creek was a battalion of Tennessee recruits, under Colonel Patton. It will be observed that my infantry was all raw. The cavalry was good, but half mounted; no horseshoes, and forage scarce. My artillery was out of all proportion, and a perfect encumbrance; horses scarcely able to drag the pieces. I had an immense wagon train, being the transportation of the command proper and of other troops now gone to Knoxville or otherwise left with me. On Longstreet's crossing at Loudon I received a dispatch from your headquarters to make arrangements for getting my command up to the vicinity of Cumberland Gap.

November 16, received an order from General Parke, chief of staff, that, in event of telegraphic communication being cut off, I should secure my retreat to Cumberland Gap, where it was expected that 100,000 rations were accumulated, and which point was to be held in every event. The same night telegraphic communication with Knoxville ceased.

I had now to retreat 52 miles in the face of superior numbers; cross the Holston and the Clinch, two rocky, deep, and rapid rivers; carry an immense train of wagons and cumbersome artillery; the roads broken up with mud and blocked up with thousands of refugees, with their families, ox-teams, furniture, tables, and feather-beds.

On the morning of the 18th, I made a demonstration as if to advance against the enemy, started cavalry parties on every road leading toward Greenville, and threw Garrard's brigade (not the same troops formerly defeated) across the Holston at Rogersville, with orders to advance straight up the road toward Kingsport. Meantime, my infantry, artillery, and trains were marching in retreat toward Bean's Station, under the cover of this cavalry movement. The troops at Morristown, including those from Mossy Creek, were ordered to the same point by a different ford. Everything, except parts of the cavalry division, was concentrated at Bean's Station that night without a single accident.

I was rather in hopes the enemy would attack me, and halted there through the next day. We had stolen a march on the enemy, and the men felt as well as if they had gained a victory.

On the morning of the 19th, I sent a cavalry detachment down the telegraph line as far as Morristown, and succeeded for a short time in reopening communication. A party had been sent out from Knoxville, and repaired the wires at that end of the line. The orders of the major-general commanding were here renewed, viz, to push on to Cumberland Gap and make that point secure.