enemy's rear and flank. Two brigades of Major-General Buckner's division, under Brig. General B. R. Johnson, having arrived the day before, were ordered to move in rear of General McLaws, and at a convenient distance, to be thrown in as circumstances might require.

On the night of the 28th, General McLaws' letter of that date was received. General McLaws' letter was shown to General Leadbetter, and my answer was read to him. General Leadbetter then suggested the postscript which I added to the answer. The assault was made at the appointed time by Generals Wofford's, Humphreys', and Bryan's brigades. The troops were not formed as well to the front as they should have been. Their lines should have been formed close up on our line of rifle-pits, which would have given them but about 200 yards to advance under fire. Instead of this lines were formed several hundred yards in rear of the pits.

My orders were that the advance should be made quietly until they entered the works, which was to be announced by a shout. The troops moved up in gallant style and formed handsomely at the outside of the ditch. As I approached the troops seemed to be in good order at the edge of the ditch,and some of the colors appeared to be on the works. When within about 500 yards of the fort I saw some of the men straggling back, and heard that the troops could not pass the ditch for want of ladders or other means. Almost at the same moment I saw that the men were beginning to retire in considerable numbers, and very soon the column broke up entirely and fell back in confusion. I ordered Buckner's brigade halted and retired,a nd sent the order for Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, to be halted and retired, but the troops of the latter brigade had become excited and rushed up to the same point from which the others had been repulsed, and were soon driven back. Officers were set to work to rally the men, and good order was soon restored.

About half an hour after the repulse Major Branch, of Major-General Ransom's staff, arrived with a telegram from the President through General Ransom, informing me that General Bragg had retired before superior numbers, and directing that I should proceed to co-operate with him. Orders were issued at once for our trains to move back to Loudon in order that we might follow as soon as possible to rejoin General Bragg.

On the afternoon of the same day I received a note from General Wheeler, by General Bragg's authority, directing that I should rejoin him at Ringgold, if practicable. Reports began to come in at the same time that the enemy were in force at Cleveland. As the note of General Wheeler seemed to indicate that it was doubtful whether I could effect a junction with General Bragg, I ordered my trains to return to me at Knoxville. It appeared to me that the best thing for us was to hold the enemy at Knoxville until the army at Chattanooga should be obliged to make heavy detachments to succor the garrison at Knoxville, and that in that way we would be able to relieve General Bragg's army,and give him time to rally and to receive re-enforcements. The principal officers of the command were called to advise, and the general opinion expressed was, that it would be imprudent to attempt to rejoin General Bragg with the lights then before us. About this time two messengers came from must depend on "my own resources." Upon this I determined to remain at Knoxville until seriously threatened by a succoring army from Chattanooga, and wrote to General Ransom, then at Rogersville,