On the 21st, I received from General Longstreet a communication, of which the following is a copy:

HEADQUARTERS, November 21, 1863.

Maj. General L. McLAWS,
Commanding Division:

GENERAL: General Bragg telegraphs me that the enemy is threatening his left and wants to know it is not possible to bring the enemy here to battle. The only chance that I see of doing anything in time to do good is an assault upon the redoubt. This made in the moonlight by three of your brigades, I think, would result in a great success; yet I am loath to put the troops at it when there is a disinclination to it. Suppose you organize an assault to-morrow and have a talk with the officers,and see if you cannot impress the importance of it upon them. The loss, I feel assured, will not be great compared with the importance of the move. I will be up to see you in the morning. The officers and men must understand that once they start they must move rapidly on till the work is over.

Very respectfully,

JAMES LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

I consulted with some of my best officers, and finding that they were adverse to the assault, especially if made at night, as they could not hold themselves responsible for their men unless they could see them, I so reported to General Longstreet. In discussion with General Longstreet I informed him that two regimental commanders, viz, Lieutenant-Colonel Fiser, of the Seventeenth Mississippi (Humphreys' brigade),and Lieutenant-Colonel Holt, of the Tenth Georgia (Bryan's brigade), were of the opinion that they could take the work, and I would put them at it if an assault should be made. And as the works of the enemy had not at that time been reconnoitered to an extent sufficient to give any positive knowledge of its strength, or of the depth of the ditch around it, I proposed to take bundles of straw, each man to carry a bundle, and fill up the ditch, if there was any.

There was a doubt about there being any ditch, because citizens had told us, and also some officers of artillery who had been in Knoxville when the works were constructed, so far as we constructed them, that the dirt to make the parapet had been taken principally from the inside of the work (Fort Loudon); that the fort was around the apex of a hill which had been smoothed off and the earth thrown to make a parapet, and if there was any digging on the outside it was in holes here and there with intervening high places, and that there was no regular ditch; but this assault, as I have said, was abandoned.

The picket line of Wofford's brigade and the left of my division having been advanced to cover it, with that of my right, was not supported by a proper advance of General Jenkins' line on my left. This want of support was reported to General Longstreet, but was not corrected up to the 24th, when the enemy, taking advantage of it, made a sortie with the Second Michigan Regiment and attacked the left flank and rear of Wofford's skirmishers, gaining a temporary advantage; but the picket reserves coming up the enemy were driven back with the loss of 50 or 60 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The sharpshooters of Wofford's brigade had 5 men wounded, 2 mortally. The Third Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters (Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchings) distinguished itself in this encounter.