succeed. I did not consider that ladders or fascines or any other appliances were necessary to enable the men to get into the work- none certainly to cross the ditch, which had been declared to be no obstacle in the way of an assault, and none certainly to ascend parapets sloping at an angle of 45 degrees. And even if I had thought so, I had no time or materials, or tools, or any means of any kind wherewith to make anything. The commands were without tools of any kind, without axes even, and their wagons and quartermasters were at Loudon; left there by orders from General Longstreet's headquarters. And, in addition, no such aids to get into the work were for a moment thought essential or were ever mentioned, except to be scouted at by the officer acting as chief engineer, whose duty it was to have advised them, at least, if he thought them necessary. I did think of them myself; but when I considered that nothing could be made at the time allowed me before the assault. I thought that to mention them even and not to have them would create hesitation and detract from the dash and determined purpose so necessary to succeed, although I did not consider them essential.

The following certificate (copy of) will explain itself in connection with the above:

I, the undersigned, J. J. Middleton, captain and acting quartermaster Fifteenth South Carolina Regiment, do hereby depose and certify that I was acting division quartermaster McLaws' division from the time we left Loudon, on November 15, 1863, until some day after the assault on November 29. During this period we were without trains, carpenters, tools, blacksmiths, &c.: had no appliances for the manufacture of ladders, and had no lumber out of which they could have been made properly. Had an order for such articles been issued, it would have been necessary to call for large details, and for said details to have found their own tools. Communication with Loudon was very uncertain, owing to the miserable condition of the roads, and the division to which I was attached might almost have been turned self-supporting, so entirely was it dependent on its own exertions for almost everything that was effected.

J. J. MIDDLETON,

Captain, and A. Q. M., 15th South Carolina Regiment.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this December 17, 1864.

JAMES M. GOGGIN,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

After dark on the 28th, before moonrise, I sent my inspector (Major Costin) and my aide-de-camp (Captain Lamar) to superintend the advance of my sharpshooters all along my line, and they reported to me during the night that the enemy had been driven from their pits, a number of prisoners taken, and that my sharpshooters had advanced beyond the enemy's pits and within easy range of the enemy's works, and were intrenching themselves. I reported this fact to General Longstreet, and communicated also that General Humphreys' advance had found an abatis in front of their line. In reply, Colonel Sorrel wrote: "The point (or front) of attack is not the time to make discouraging reports." My reports was of a fact which had come to my knowledge, and was for the information of the commander-in-chief only. I did nod intend any discouragement, certainly.

Before 4 o'clock on the morning of the 29th I went around with my staff to superintend the execution of my orders for the assault. It was evident to me that the enemy were aware that one was intended, and I think it probable they knew where it was to be made, for while I was talking to Colonel Ruff on the railroad the enemy threw a shell, which burst over the woods just in rear of us through