son's brigade to lead the movement of the division. Being compelled by a deep railroad cut running along my front to cross the railroad on the right of my line, I massed my troops near the right, to support and continue the attack when begun.

By previous arrangements with the lieutenant-general commanding, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Logan, in charge of my picket line, to advance during the night previous and drive in or capture the enemy's picket line, and to place his skirmishers in rifle-pits at close range to the enemy's breastworks, so as fully to command them. This was successfully done, capturing some 60 of the enemy, driving the rest into their works, and occupying such a position with the sharpshooters as greatly to embarrass the enemy during the attack of the next day.

Expecting the attack to be begun at first dawn, I placed Anderson's brigade in position during the night, and at 4 a. m. massed the other two brigades on my right.

Having explained the plan of operations to my brigade commanders and taken every precaution to follow up the attack successfully, I awaited the concerted signal. General Anderson, in accordance with the part assigned my command, was ordered to subordinate his move as to time to the attacking column of McLaws. I instructed him to break over the enemy's breastworks at a point which I designated to him personally about 100 yards to the left of the fort, and then to wheel to the left and sweep down the breastworks. If, however, McLaws' attack upon the fort was unsuccessful, he was instructed, after passing over the enemy's breastworks, instead of wheeling to the left to wheel to the right and take the fort by an attack in reverse.

Just before the time for the expected attack, I received orders to meet any demonstration the enemy might make on my line, which was an extended one, with my left brigade. In accordance with this order, I was compelled to send Jenkins' brigade some distance toward the left to be in position to meet such a demonstration, and my effective force in hand for immediate use was thus reduced to the brigade of Anderson, diminished by picket details to some 900 or 1,000 rifles, and Benning's brigade, with about 500 rifles. Upon a given signal the sharpshooters along the whole line opened a continuous fire, and the attack was begun by McLaws' column. Giving due time, as directed, Anderson's brigade advanced in two lines in gallant style, and I then moved Benning's brigade forward to press any advantage that might be gained. The columns of McLaws, instead of directing their attack against the salient indicated to me by the lieutenant-general commanding as the point for their attack, advanced to the right of the designated point, and after a vain effort failed to carry the work and were compelled to retire.

Anderson's brigade-as stated by General Anderson, through some misunderstanding of his instructions by the colonel commanding his front line, who was misled by the movements of McLaws' column so far to the right-instead of directing its attack, as I had ordered, against the breastworks to the left of the fort, and then, in case of the failure of McLaws' column taking it in reverse, also moved too far to the right, and before the staff officer and courier, dispatched the moment I perceived their misdirection to order them to the point already designated, could reach them, the distance being short from their starting point to the fort, became involved in the direct attack upon the side of the fort.