effective cavalrymen, commanded by Major Shaw, and 44 effective men belonging to Captain Van Dyke's cavalry company, constituted the force under my command.

On the morning of November 26, Colonel Long's cavalry brigade of Federal troops were moved from Cleveland, Tennessee, against our position. Our troops were formed on the north side of the Hiwassee River, for the purpose of protecting the bridges across the stream. After a struggle of more than an hour, the enemy were driven back, with slight loss. We did not suffer. The bridges were saved.

On November 29, I received from General Bragg an order to Lieutenant-General Longstreet. I forwarded this order immediately by telegraph and by courier to Lieutenant-General Longstreet. By this order Lieutenant-General Longstreet was ordered to fall back immediately upon Dalton, Ga., or to retire to Virginia. I immediately telegraphed to General Longstreet, stating that unless he intended to fall back upon Dalton, there was no necessity to hold my position longer. The dispatch was sent at 3 p. m. Had I been informed by General Longstreet that he did not intend to use the bridges at Charleston, I should have left for Dalton on the night of the 29th. I could have reached the place with safety. The enemy were at Cleveland in heavy force, yet by moving on the old Federal road, I should have left them far to the right. General Longstreet replied to my telegram, asking for information, and led me to suppose he might retire from Knoxville by way of Charleston. I immediately replied, giving him what information I could, and again stated that my position was becoming very critical, and that unless he intended to use the bridges it was entirely unnecessary for me to remain longer at Charleston.

I received instructions from General Longstreet when the enemy was on all the roads between me and Dalton. I was ordered by him to destroy the bridges when I retired. I waited on the north side of the Hiwassee River until the enemy came up. Four thousand infantry, distinctly seen and counted, in two lines of battle, with cavalry on the flanks, were moved against us. Six pieces of artillery opened upon us a heavy fire, and I was informed that about 800 cavalry were crossing the river below. I immediately ordered the wagons and troops, preceded by a small cavalry force, to move rapidly on the Riceville road. I and my staff remained in Calhoun, on the north side of the river, until the skirmishers of the enemy reached the bridges. They found the bridges destroyed. The troops of the enemy were still passing through a defile in a range of hills on the opposite side of the river. I waited until I had seen about 6,000 soldiers debouch upon the plain before us. I then, with the remainder of the cavalry, followed our wagons and troops, leaving 3 men behind to watch the movements of the enemy. These men subsequently reported that the enemy were at least 15,000 strong, and that they had with them more than fifteen pieces of artillery. Our men reached Riceville a very short time before the enemy's cavalry did, having marched more than 7 miles within an hour and a half.

We continued our march, moving as rapidly as possible, and at Sweet Water took the cars for Loudon. I reported to Brigadier-General Vaughn, commanding at that place.

I am glad to say that during the march we lost nothing. I started from Charleston with 50 barefooted men, yet only 12 of them were left behind.