On the evening of the 22nd, I received the following dispatch from the lieutenant-general commanding and disposed my forces for the attack:

HEADQUARTERS, November 22, 1863.

Major General JOSEPH WHEELER,
Commanding Cavalry:

GENERAL: General McLaws is trying to arrange for an assault upon the redoubt in his front to-night. It will be made by an advance of our entire line of skirmishers after dark. The skirmishers must advance as near as possible to the enemy's trenches, say 100 yards. They are to get shelter there and continue to engage the enemy in his trenches until the work is accomplished. Advance your skirmishers as you hear the firing of the pickets on your right and hold the enemy in his trenches along your front. If he quits them,

take the hills in front of you, or at least one of them. If your

skirmishers will get up tolerably close they can see if the enemy

quits his trenches. If the artillery in front of you is opened upon

our right put your batteries in position and engage the enemy's batteries, so as to relieve our columns as much as possible.

Most respectfully,

JAMES LONGSTREET,

Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

P. S.-The battery on General Jenkins' left is ordered to open upon

the Temperance Hill a little before night to get the range, and it

will play upon the same hill after night, so as to try and create

the impression that the attack will be made there. Try and favor that diversion as much as you can. Keep the matter perfectly quiet.

On the 21st, I had received a communication from the lieutenant-general commanding, of which the following is an extract:

Colonel Lyon, in command near Kingston, reports two regiments of cavalry and two pieces of artillery at Kingston. It appears to me this party might be captured.

About 10 o'clock on the night of the 22nd, I received a dispatch from the lieutenant-general commanding, saying that the contemplated attack would be postponed, and continued by saying:

You will have to march, therefore, early to-morrow for Kingston, leaving a brigade to picket and scout upon our left. You will please give particular and minute instructions to the brigade

commander whom you leave. Try and reach Kingston before day on the

24th; drive in the pickets there, and you will then ascertain whether the enemy has been re-enforced. If he has not, capture or disperse the force that is there.

Pursuant to these instructions I issued orders for the march and directed the command to fall back and feed. To accomplish this it was necessary for half the command to fall back 7 miles, and therefore it did not get into camp until nearly daylight, shortly after which time I was obliged to commence the march. The roads were so bad that the most strenuous exertions enabled me to make but 26 miles before dark. Being still 20 miles from Kingston, I left orders for the command to follow, and proceeded with my escort rapidly on the road toward that place. On arriving in the vicinity I learned that the enemy had re-enforced with infantry, but could not learn the extent.

About 3 a. m. the command came up much worn and exhausted, half of the men having lost two nights' sleep, and during the march of the preceding day had necessarily received short allowance of rations.

Five of our best regiments had been left at Knoxville, and, as I afterward learned, many of our men had been left at various points

along the road, they from exhaustion being absolutely unable to keep up with the command. After an hour's rest I proceeded on with

the command and encountered the enemy's pickets 3 miles from