Starr,acting assistant inspector-general on the staff of the division commander.

To accommodate the major,the train was again stopped at Moscow,a village about 9 miles farther west. We were here detained near five minutes before again proceeding westward. What the object of this detention was has never yet been made clear to our minds,unless it was to report our arrival to his commanding officer,and,in obedience to the orders received from him,as was stated by the major,to report progress every ten minutes,if possible.

Arriving at Grisson's Bridge,distant from Moscow about 6 miles,and finding there detachments of the Eighty-ninth Indiana and One hundred and seventeenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry,under the command of Major Henry,of the first-named regiment,and this location not being far distant from the proposed field of action,we ordered a halt to learn,if possible,the situation of affairs.

The major informed us that he had sent two companies of command along the road toward La Fayette,and that they had been skirmishing some minutes with the enemy,who was reported in strong force in their front.

It was still raining very hard,from our position on the locomotive it was barely possible to see distinctly anything at a distance beyond 200 or 300 yards. We concluded,therefore,that if this report of the strength of the enemy was correct,it would be to say the least,imprudent to rush blindly forward,or to move at any other than a recused rate of speed. This conclusion became at once an imperative duty,when we took into consideration the probable condition of the arms on account of the rain,and particularly those in the hands of the men had been compelled to be transported on the roofs of the cars. Added to this was the cramped condition of the men within the cars. There was therefore but little hesitancy in determining the proper course to pursue. We directed Major Henry to leave two companies of his command of his command at the bridge,and with the remainder to proceed in advance of the train,prepared to resist and to give us timely warning of any attempt on the part of the enemy to draw us into an ambush. This order was promptly responded to by the major and his men,who in a were marching as rapidly as possible along the railroad toward La Fayette. The train was kept up,and every man in readiness to quit the cars at any moment the necessity required or the nature of the ground would permit. Any one familiar with the country along the railroad extending from Grisson's Bridge to La Fayette knows it is very low,flat,and swampy,and as a route for infantry is,at almost any season of the year,impracticable;and any officer with the least degree of military talent or common sense will,we think,agree with us that to have ordered the train,loaded as it was,rapidly forward,and this,too,in the face of an enemy reported largely superior to his own force,would have merited the severest censure to say the least. We,therefore,moved cautiously,yet as rapidly as was in our open from La Fayette not to exceed one-half mile when the men were ordered off and out of the cars and into line of battle. We were induced to do this from another report received,that the enemy was in force in front of us,which report was confirmed by the increased and rapid firing of Major Henry's command,deployed a short distance in advance. Our line being formed,we advanced or attempted to advance