were the restoration of East Tennessee to the Union, and by hold-ing the two extremities of the valley to secure it from rebel invasion. The moment I received reliable information of the departure of Longstreet's Corps from the Army of the Potomac I ordered forward to General Rosecrans every available man in the Department of the Ohio, and again urged General Burnside to move to his assistance. I also telegraphed to Generals Hurlbut, and Sherman and yourself to send forward all available troops your department. If these forces had been sent to General Rosecrans by Nashville they could not have been supplied. I there fore directed them to move by Corint and the Tennessee River. The necessity of this has been proved by the fact that the re- enforcements sent to him from the Army of the Potomac have not been able, for the want of railroad transportation, to reach General Rosecrans' army in the field. In regard to the relative strength of the opposing armies, it is believed that General Rosecrans, when ha first moved against Bragg, had double if not treble his force. General Burnside also had more than double the force of Buckner, and even when Bragg and Buckner united Rosecrans' army was very greatly their superior in numbers. Even the 18,000 men sent from Virginia under Longstreet would not have given the enemy the superiority. It is now ascertained that the greater part of the prisoners paroled by you at Vicksburg and by General Banks at Port Hudson were illegally and improperly declared, and forced into the ranks to swell the rebel number at Chickamauga. This outrageous act, in violation of the laws of laws of war, of the cartel entered into by the rebel authorities, and of all sense of honor, gives us a useful lesson in regard to the character of the enemy with whom we are contending. He neither regards the rules of civilized warfare nor even his most solemn engagements. You may therefore expect to meet in arms thousands of unexchanged prisoners, released by you and others on parole not to serve again until duly exchanged. Although the enemy by this disgraceful means have been able to concentrate in Georgia and Alabama a much larger force than we anticipated, your armies will be abundantly able to defeat him. Your difficulty will not be in the want of men, but in the means of supplying them at this season of the year. A single-track railroad can supply an army of 60,000 or 70,000 men, with the usual number of cavalry and artillery, but beyond that number or with a large force the difficulty of supply is very great. I do not know the present condition of the road from Nashville to Decatur, but, if practicable to repair it, the use of that triangle will be of great assistance to you. I hope, also, that the recent rises of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers will enable you to employ water transportation to Nashville and Eastport or Florence. If you re-occupy the passes of Lookout Mountain, which should never have been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of vital importance, and should receive your early attention. I submit this summary in the hope that it will assist you in fully understanding the object of the campaign and the means of attaining these objects. Probably the Secretary of War in his interviews with you at Louisville has gone over the same ground.

Whatever measures you may deem proper to adopt under existing circumstances you will receive all possible assistance from the authorities at Washington. You have never heretofore complained