LOUDON, Tennessee, October 27, 1863-7 p. m.

(Received 11.45 a. m., 28th.)

Major General U. S. GRANT,

Chattanooga, Tennessee, and

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief:

We have had many reports here with reference to Ewell's corps coming from Lee's army against us by way of Abingdon, but the indications are that no such force has yet made its appearance at Abingdon, and I am inclined to believe the reports to be incorrect. But there is a considerable force from Bragg's army on this side of the Hiwassee; one division at Sweet Water and two others said to be approaching there. We have had constant cavalry skirmishing for several days, the first day resulting in a loss to us of over 400 prisoners from Wolford's brigade, but since that day the results have been in our favor. The morning I came here I determined that the position held by our troops on the railroad side of the river was not a good position for defense, except for a larger force than can possibly be spared. For this place I ordered what I considered to be sufficient re-enforcements to make a move toward the Hiwassee, but I am now satisfied that no decisive result will follow a movement. We might drive the enemy to the Hiwassee River, but as their cars run up to the crossing a sufficient force could be concentrated against us by them, no doubt, to drive us back, and no good would result from the movement. I have been warned by General Halleck not to be caught on the south side of the river, and nothing but a strong desire to attack a force from the front of the Army of the Cumberland ever kept me on that side, because I am not strong enough to attack them in the flank, although I was at one time favorable to passing their flank and attacking their communications. I have, therefore, thought it best to withdraw the force from the south side of the river, and only attempt to hold that part of the country south of the Holston and east of Little Tennessee River, and all of that part of the State north of the Big Tennessee. Neither the Little Tennessee nor the Holston are now fordable, and I shall now move the pontoon-bridge to some point above the junction of these rivers, and hold Kingston and Knoxville as strongly as possible. We are building pontoon-boats as rapidly as possible at Kingston for a bridge across the Tennessee just below the mouth of the Clinch River, which, with a flank movement in case they attempt to move up the railroad to Loudon in force, [sic]

I telegraphed you several days ago in reference to the construction of a road which we propose to draw our supplies on. If the railroad to McMinnville is in operation, it is possible that supplies might be drawn from there; but it is reported as almost impracticable, particularly at the crossing of the Caney Fork River. I am satisfied that if the enemy hold the country about Chattanooga so that we cannot command the railroad, we shall have to draw our supplies from the head of navigation on the Cumberland, near the mouth of the Big South Fork. Steps have been taken to put the road in condition for winter travel from that place. The only Indiana regiments we have are in the extreme front. Details will be sent as soon as possible. Our necessities for subsistence and clothing will prevent us from accumulating a supply of ammunition as rapidly as