driven the enemy with loss, are marching by left flank to Chickasaw to cross. Sherman received your orders by messenger. I have given Sherman eighteen regiments of infantry, my best artillery, and a regiment of cavalry, in all 11,000 men. This strips me to a position of positive weakness. I have at and near Memphis 3,500 infantry. Beyond Memphis two white and three colored regiments and 4,500 cavalry; one colored regiment at Moscow, two white and two colored at Corinth. I shall try to hold the railroad with cavalry, but know it cannot be done if seriously attacked. I sent, ten days since, a request to Steele to send me some regiments. From this I have just heard. He declines doing it, except under orders from Schofield. Those orders have gone, but it will be two weeks before the troops arrive. If I am seriously threatened I shall bring everything to Moscow and abandon the railroad beyond. Dodge will cross at Eastport as soon as Sherman gets out of his way. Provisions for 30,000 men should be at Stevenson for them within ten days. I will do my best on the line, but must not b blamed if it is broken. Lee's cavalry is very bold, and will follow our troops down to Iuka.

S. A. HURLBUT,

Major-General, Commanding.

(Same to Grant, received at Chattanooga November 2.)

HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tennessee, October 30, 1863.

Colonel J. C. KELTON,

Asst. Adjt. General, Hdqrs. Army, Washington, D. C.:

SIR: General William T. Sherman having received pressing orders from Major General U. S. Grant directing a rapid advance with all disposable force on the north side of the Tennessee to Stevenson, I have detached from this corps to accompany him eighteen of my best regiments of infantry with a full proportion of artillery. I had previously permanently transferred the Fifth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry and one battery of artillery from the Sixteenth Corps. In all, the draft from this corps within ten days will amount to 11,000 men. These troops thus sent are, as they should be, the best that I have, and in capital order for active duty. I desire in stating these drafts have so weakened my force on the line of the Charleston and Memphis Railroad as to render its possession and security very problem atical.

I have no force in the city of Memphis which can well be moved without endangering our heavy depot of ordnance and other supplies. East of Memphis, and including Corinth, I shall have six regiments of infantry and about 4,500 cavalry; force enough, if together, to repel and punish any probable attack, but liable to be struck in detail and cut off from communications. Corinth has heavy stores and strong works, and even with its light garrison of four regiments, two white and two colored, can hold out within its fortifications, but scarcely save the stores and track. The cavalry is kept actively at work and well to the front, and is fully able to hold its own with the force from Mississippi. My apprehension, however, is that as soon as my detached force is thrown across the Tennessee, Stephen D. Lee, who has 4,000 mounted men, with good