general has been under a serious apprehension of insurrections in the interior and northern counties. From the best advices we could obtain here, there were not sufficient grounds for such apprehensions. But, as General Curtis had better means of judging of the dangers, I did not deem it proper to entirely disregard his fears. In the early part of the war, when Price was within the State, or near the frontier, with a large army, there was a necessity for a considerable force in the interior, but the case is now very different, and I am told by reliable Union men that the volunteer troops, especially those from Kansas, in the counties on the Missouri River, do much more harm than good by annoying, irritating, and plundering the inhabitants. It is said that those there who at the outset sided with Price and his rebel gang, but have since been permitted to return and settle down as quiet and peaceable citizens, are now treated as enemies. No worse policy could possibly be adopted. It is hoped you will remedy these alleged evils, and send south into the field all the volunteer troops who can be spared from Missouri and Kansas. There has been no hostile force in Kansas since the beginning of this war, nor has there been, so far as I could learn, any danger of an invasion of that State, or of an insurrection of its inhabitants against the Government and authority of the United States; and yet a very large force has been kept and supported there, at an enormous expense to the National Treasury, and to the annoyance and injury of the inhabitants of the bordering territory. Both while in command of that department and since, I have endeavored to bring these forces into the field, where they could be made useful to the Government; but in these efforts I have been overruled, and for reasons which I could never fully understand, these enormously expensive troops have been left in Kansas, where they were of no possible use, or sent into Missouri, where they were very much worse than useless. In my opinion they should be either sent to Salt Lake, to guard the emigrant trains, or moved south to fight the rebels. In whatever use you may determine to make of these troops, you will have all the support which the War Department and these headquarters can give you. A regiment of Nebraska cavalry, on report of General Curtis that it could be spared from his department, was ordered some time ago to report for duty to General Pope, at Sioux City, for operations against the Indians. The authorities of Nebraska afterward protested against this order, and General Curtis asked that it be rescinded. This was refused. Nevertheless, General Pope reports that the order has never been complied with, and I cannot ascertain from General Curtis how the matter now really stands. You will immediately examine into this matter, and either carry out the original order to General Curtis, or use these troops to escort emigrant trains to Salt Lake, as under existing circumstances you may deem best. You will, as soon as you ascertain the real facts of the case, advise General Pope, and give him all possible assistance in his contemplated Indian campaign. At this distance, and acting under very imperfect information, I cannot give you on these subjects very positive or minute instructions. Much must be left to your discretion and more enlightened judgment; but we will leave, for the present, active military operations in the field, and direct our attention for a moment to administrative matter, which will constitute the most annoying, arduous, perplexing, and responsible duties of your command.

On this subject I commend to your careful attention the field instructions published in General Orders, Numbers 100, current series. These in-