HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,
Shreveport, La., October 14, 1863.

Lieutenant General T. H. HOLMES,

Commanding District of Arkansas:

GENERAL: I inclosing to you the within order, I am directed by Lieutenant-General Smith to say that by reason of the change in the positions of the armies of Arkansas and the Indian country, he has thought it best to separate the commands for the present. From the difficulty and uncertainty of communication between the two armies as at present situated, and in consequence of the directs intercourse now established between department headquarters and the command of Brigadier-General Steele, it is important that he should make his reports returns direct.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. S. ANDERSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure.]

SPECIAL ORDERS,
HDQRS. TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,

Numbers 154.
Shreveport, La., October 3, 1863.

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III. Until further orders the Department of the Indian Territory will be separated from the District of Arkansas.

Brigadier General William Steele, commanding the Indian Territory, will in future make his reports, &c., direct to department headquarters.

* * * *

By command of Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith:

S. S. ANDERSON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE INDIAN TERRITORY,
Camp Sabine, C. N., October 14, 1863.

Brigadier General HENRY E. MCCULLOCH,

Commanding Northern Sub-District of Texas:

GENERAL: Your communication of the 12th instant was received per yesterday's express. The intelligence communicated is certainly cheering. Do try, general, to get General Magruder to send some of the arms to this section. I have hard nothing as yet from General Cooper officially, though I wrote to him from Bonham. If I receive no official intelligence from him by to-day's express, I shall express to him by courier without delay. I am at a loss as to what answer to return you with regard to your inquiry as to re-enforcements, owing too the entire absence of official information from the front. Such information as comes to me unofficially leads me to the belief that the enemy does not contemplate a speedy movement in force. If a defensive policy with my present line sweep to be pursued, I could, perhaps, hold the enemy in check against his present reported strength. It occurs to my mind, however, that it General Magruder could spare, say from 3,000 to 5,000 troops, and have them put quietly and rapidly into this department, a rapid campaign could be made, driving out or capturing such numbers of the enemy as are now in the Indian country, destroying his depots of supplies, &c. If these troops sufficient time, before the weather becomes too severe for operations in the field, in which to consummate a