much vigor that by 11 a.m. of the morning of the 30th he had a safe communication between his two lines. During this day the enemy opened a battery on my right, almost enfilading my front line, wounding several of my men. The 31st was occupied in widening, and perfecting may saps and works, the enemy again enfilading my front line with his battery on the right, badly wounding several of my men. Long before this we had silenced all the batteries in our front, but this one was so far to the right we could not reach it with our musketry. At night I prepared and masked a Rodman gun of the First Indiana Battery between my two lines of works to bear upon the enemy's gun, which had done this damage, so that when he opened on us the morning of April 1 he was able to fir but four shots until our Rodman silenced him,and never allowed him to open again during the siege. This night I determined to advance my line again thirty yards, opening up my third line of works. This third line of works I subsequently opened out so as to permit the passage of artillery through my entire works under cover. On the evening of the 2nd of April I started two saps from my front line, one from my right and one from my left center. These saps were driven with such vigor that by the evening of the 8th we were within twenty-five or thirty yards of the enemy's works.

At 6 p.m. on the evening, of the 8th I received orders to man my trenches with 300 men, and moved with the balance of my brigade to the right to support the Third Brigade, which had turned the enemy's left. My orders were to report my presence to Colonel Geddes, commanding Third Brigade, and to offer him any needed support. I found that Colonel Geddes had left the field, leaving his brigade in command of Colonel Turner. I immediately threw out the Thirty-third Wisconsin to cover his flank, which seemed threatened, and ordered the Ninety-fifth Illinois to open a road through the enemy's abatis, so as to be able to move troops and artillery to his assistance if he were pushed. This work was finished by 8 p.m. when I received orders from the general commanding to open a line of works from the front trenches of the Third Brigade to the left of the enemy's trenches, which had been turned and was occupied by the Third Brigade. At about 10 p.m., finding that the skirmishers of the Third Brigade had not pushed out to develop the enemy's position, as I had understood the general to order, upon a conference with yourself I determined to move my command back in my trenches and form them and push the enemy's works in my front. I immediately gave the orders, and while my staff officers were bringing up and forming my brigade, I ordered Major James, of the Seventy-second Illinois, who was field officer of the day and in charge of the 300 men in the trenches, to deploy his men in strong skirmish line and break through the enemy's skirmish line, which was covered in rifle-pits in front of their main works, and which had kept up a constant fire on our front. Finding that this movement should be made with great rapidity, in order, if the enemy were evacuating, to prevent him from escaping, destroying, or getting off his property or if, as was the general theory, he was falling back and forming a new line, by a rapid attack to break him and throw him into confusion. I gave orders for the brigade to move forward rapidly, pushing forward the skirmishers as rapidly as possible to the enemy's works, capturing his entire skirmish line. Immediately upon reaching the enemy's main works and if possible develop his position, in this manner passing near