feet; height of stockade on the glacis, five feet; sunk into the earth, four feet. The ground over which the troops advanced is an open field, generally level, sloping slightly toward the works, but intersected by one ravine and marshy soil, which both the right and left of Long's line experienced some difficulty in crossing. The distance which the troops charged, exposed to the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry, was 600 yards. Particular attention is invited to that part of General Long's report which describes the assault. He states that the number actually engaged in the charge was 1,550 officers and men. The portion of the line assaulted was manned by Armstrong's brigade, regarded as the best in Forrest's corps, and reported by him at more than 1,500 men. The loss from Long's division was 40 killed, 260 wounded, and 7 missing. General Long was wounded in the head, Colonels Miller and McCormick in the legs, and Colonel Biggs in the breast.

I doubt if the history of this or any other war will show another instance in which a line of works as strongly constructed and as well defended as this by musketry and artillery has been stormed and carried by a single line of men without support. Too much credit cannot be accorded to General Long, Colonels Minty, Miller, or Vail, or to the gallant officers and men under their command. I submit herewith a map of Selma and its defenses, surveyed and drawn by Captain H. E. Noyes, Second U. S. Cavalry, and aide-de-camp.* The immediate fruits of our victory were 31 field guns and one 30-pounder Parrott which had been used against us, 2,700 prisoners, including 150 officers, a number of colors, and immense quantities of stores of every kind. Generals Forrest, Armstrong, Roddey, and Adams escaped with a number of men under cover of darkness, either by the Burnsville and river roads or by swimming the Alabama River. A portion of Upton's division pursued on the Burnsville road until long after midnight, capturing four guns and many prisoners. I estimate the entire garrison, including the militia of the city and surrounding country, at 7,000 men. The entire force under my command engaged and in supporting distance was 9,000 men and eight guns. As soon as the troops could be assembled and got into camp I assigned Brevet Brigadier-General Winslow to the command of the city with orders to destroy everything that could possibly benefit the rebel cause. I directed General Upton to march at daylight with his division for the purpose of driving Chalmers to the west side of the Cahawba, to open communication with McCook, expected from Centerville, and in conjunction with the latter to bring in the train. The capture of Selma having put us in possession of the enemy's greatest depot in the Southwest was a vital blow to their cause and secured to us the certainty of going in whatever direction might be found most advantageous. I gave directions to Lieutenant Heywood, Fourth Michigan Cavalry, engineer officer on my staff, to employ all the resources of the shops in the city in the construction of pontoons, with the intention of laying a bridge and crossing to the south side of the Alabama River as soon as I could satisfy myself in regard to General Canby's success in the operations against Mobile. On April 5 Upton and McCook arrived with the train, but nothing definite had been heard of Croxton. McCook had been entirely successful in his operations against Centerville, but on reaching Scottsborough he found Jackson well posted with a force he thought too strong to attack. After a sharp skirmish he retired to Centerville, burned the Scottsborough cotton factory and Cahawha bridge, and returned toward

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*See Plate LXX, Map 4, of the Atlas.

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