position at this time was about 1,400 yards from the strong works of the enemy, behind which he was posted. At about 4.30 o'clock, at on interview with the division commander, I was notified that the line was about to make the assault upon the works of the enemy, who had already commenced the use of his artillery upon our line. I was further directed to conform the movements of my battery as much as I could to the movement and advance of our line, and to direct my fire so as to produce the most effect upon the enemy and to render the most assistance to the advance of the line making the assault. I therefore decided that as the line advanced to advance one section of my battery as close to the enemy's works as the nature of the ground would permit, that my fire could be directed with more precision and effect. Noticing movements in the line on my right, which I supposed to be an advance, I moved one section forward about 400 yards, thus exposing both its flanks to an almost direct fire from the enemy's artillery, while he was using it upon me directly in my front. As I was thus in an advanced and very exposed position with this section, and having mistaken the movements of the line for an immediate advance, I withdrew this section to my first position and kept up my firing from that point until the line moved forward to the assault, when I moved my whole battery forward to the advanced position referred to, replying rapidly to the fire of the enemy's artillery until it was silenced by the close approach of our men to the works, which in a moment more were in their possession. From this advanced position I was able to partially enfilade a long line of the enemy's works on my left, which was being enfiladed by the fire of our forces that had carried the works to my right and front, causing the enemy to seek shelter outside of the breast-works and between them and the palisades, under the protection of which he was endeavoring to make his escape. Noticing this, I directed the fire of the two of my guns down this line, and with good effect. At the same time I ordered one section, under Lieutenant Griffin, to advance inside the works, now in our possession, for the purpose of engaging the rebel artillery, that had now opened upon our line from works close up to town, riding forward myself to select the position for the section. The road was now being rapidly filled by an advancing column of mounted troops, which prevented this section from getting upon as promptly as I desired, but I soon had it in position, closely followed by the balance of my battery, and opened upon the inner line of works, which, like the first, was soon in the possession, of our troops, and rendering further firing unnecessary. Receiving no further orders, and having learned that the brigadier-general commanding had been wounded early in the engagement, I held my battery awaiting orders from his successor, which I received from Colonel R. H. G. Minty late in the evening to go into camp. I have no losses to report during this engagement.

On the morning of April 3, by direction of the colonel commanding division, I proceeded to destroy the captured ordnance along the line of works, of which the following is a memorandum, viz: 30-pounder Parrott gun, 1; 14-pounder iron guns (old model), 5; 12-pounder light guns, 4; 3-inch rifled guns, 3; 12-pounder howitzers, 3; 6-pounder rifled guns (brass), 2; mountain howitzers, 2; total, 20 guns, with carriages. These guns were spiked, the trunnions knocked off the most of them, rendering them entirely useless until recast. The carriages and limbers with four field caissons were burned. I also caused to be destroyed about 4,300 rounds of ammunition.

On the evening of April 5 I received orders from the colonel commanding to have a section in readiness at midnight to accompany an