urged that the road was clear and practicable, and that while the country would furnish little or nothing in the way of supplies, yet we had ample stores at Meadow Bluff and Gauley River. As the question of supplies was one that involved the existence of the army the Kanawha route was decided upon, and messengers immediately sent forward to have supplies sent out from these points to meet the troops.

On the night of the 24th we rested at the Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs. From this point I ordered a regiment of cavalry to follow the supply train going toward Beverly, and assist Colonel Putnam in its defense if necessary.

On the 25th passed through Lewisburg and halted in the evening near Meadow Bluff. I ascertained that the officer left in command at this post with 400 men had become alarmed at some demonstrations by guerrillas, and had, with baggage and supplies, fallen back to Gauley Bridge.

On the 27th, between Meadow Bluff and Gauley, met the supply train with 70,000 rations for the troops; they arrived in good time to prevent suffering, and their appearance was greeted by hearty cheers. Halted for the night near Gauley Bridge. Remained here on the 28th and 29th, allowing time for stragglers to come up and to refresh and organize the command.

Arrived at Charleston, Kanawha, on the 30th June, and remained until July 3, reorganizing and refitting the troops, and gathering up steamers to transport the army by water to Parkersburg. Feeling assured that the enemy would take advantage of the absence of these troops to make some demonstrations in the Valley, every nerve was strained to hasten their movement. But the obstacles were for a time insurmountable. After their recent fatigues neither men nor animals were in any condition for a farther march, and the excessive heat of the weather would have rendered such an attempt ruinous to the army. Transportation by water, if practicable, would save time, and rest the men and horses. Yet, on account of the long drought, the Ohio River was reported to be so low as to be impassable to the smallest boats; nevertheless, all the light-draught boats that could be found were seized and the troops embarked.

Arriving at Parkersburg on the afternoon of July 4, I received information that the enemy had appeared in force in the Valley, had driven Sigel out of Martinsburg, and were demonstrating against our railroad guards at several points west. The movement of the troops by the river route was pressed forward with the utmost diligence and zeal, yet the difficulties were even greater than at first appeared. The men had to be disembarked at the Shallows and marched around; at other points the boats could not pass, even when thus lightened, and small boats above the bars received and transported the men to other points, where they were in their turn obliged to stop. In this way the troops got in slowly, but withal sooner and in better condition than if they had attempted to march by land. The baggage trains and cavalry came to Parkersburg by the land route. At this place I remained until July 8 superintending and hastening the transportation of the troops by rail to New Creek and Cumberland.

On the night of 8th took the cars for Cumberland and arrived there on the morning of the 9th at 10 a.m. Reports from various sources indicated that the enemy was in Maryland with the greater part of his force moving toward the Monocacy. Imboden's attempts on the railroad at Sir John's and at South Branch and Patterson's