WASHINGTON, D. C., July 10, 1864-3. 30 p. m.

Lieutenant-General GRANT,

City Point:

Your telegram of 6 p. m. yesterday is received. Whether you had better come here or remain there is a question upon which I cannot advise. What you say about getting into Early's rear is perfectly correct, but unfortunately we have no forces here for the field. All such forces were sent to you long ago. What we have here are raw militia, invalids, convalescents from the hospitals, a few dismounted batteries, and the dismounted and disorganized cavalry sent up from James River. With these we expect to defend our immense depots of stores and the line of intrenchments around the city; but what can we do with such forces in the field against a column of 20,000 veterans? One-half of the men cannot march at all. The only men fit for the field was Ricketts's division, which has been defeated and badly cut up under Wallace. If the remains can hold Baltimore till we can re-enforce it I shall be satisfied. I sent invalid troops from here this morning to assist them. I can draw nothing from Harper's Ferry till Hunter effects his junction. When Hunter's army gets within reach and the Sixth Corps arrives what you propose can probably be done. Sullivan's division has reached Hedgesville, and Crook's is passing Cumberland. How strong these are and where the remainder of Hunter's army is I cannot ascertain. Rumor says that it has lost almost everything and is badly cut up. Only one battalion of heavy artillery has reached here; the other two went with Ricketts, and what is left of them is probably retreating on Baltimore. We are impressing horses to remount the cavalry. It arrives destitute of everything; there is necessary delay in preparing it for service.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

CITY POINT, VA., July 10, 1864.

Major-General MEADE,

Commanding, &c.:

Not receiving any reply from General Lee to communications sent on the 8th, I begin to believe it possible that he may have gone on the Maryland the army in your front. I think it advisable to make a reconnaissance around toward the Weldon road, pushing out skirmishers to make the enemy develop himself, and to ascertain if this be the facts. Sheridan might get up 3,000 of his best cavalry to move with such a reconnaissance. The object would be solely to ascertain if the enemy still occupies his position in full force, and if this can be ascertained without going to the Weldon road, either by swinging around a heavy line of skirmishers from Hannock's front to drive in the enemy's advance pickets and make him develop behind his works, or if is certainly known by deserters who have come in within the last twenty-four hours that no movement has taken place it will be satisfactory.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.