and a general reconnaissance of the country within a circuit of three miles from the center of the city, and have now the honor to submit the following report: The fortifications on the water approaches are permanent works, and are adequate to guard the city from any probable enterprise of the enemy's cruisers. The land defenses consist of small field forts and batteries on the outskirts of the city from any probable enterprise of the enemy's cruisers. The land defenses consist of small field forts and batteries on the outskirts of the city, extending through an arc of about 180@, and of less than ten miles of development, exclusive of a few interior works of little value. With few exceptions, these works are quite contracted, are armed with but few guns, mostly 32-pounder smooth-bores, many of which are not mounted, and some are without suitable platforms and carriages. The magazines, with few exceptions, are sufficient, though unsupplied with adequate ammunition, and their feeble garrisons of raw troops are mostly without any knowledge of the service of artillery. In the present condition of things we do not think the fortifications contribute much to the defense of Baltimore, except as rallying points and covers for infantry.

The removal of all obstructions for 1,000 yards in front of these works, and connecting them with rifle-pits would materially add to their strength, but to do this would require the sacrifice of much valuable property in gardens, parks, trees, and buildings, and a consequent large expense to the Government in the payment of damages. But as the city may require immediate protection against raids, before better defenses can be made continuous by rifle-pits and suitable emplacements for field artillery, where no material destruction of property would have to be made, and the demarkation of the line elsewhere by stakes, that it may be quickly thrown up, on the near of Ridgely's Cove and continue by Forsts A, 1/2, 1, 2, 3, 4 1/2, to 5; from Fort 5 to 7 to follow the southern crest of a deep valley in front, converting Fort 6, improperly placed on the northern crest of the ravine, into an advanced battery, with an open gorge for field artillery, which can readily be withdrawn if hard pressed by the enemy, rallying in force from the near cover of the forest of Druid Hill Park, thence across Jones' Falls, where there should be additional batteries to sweep the road and valley, to the new works being built near Camp Bradford, and on the York road, thence to he Friends Cemetery, on the Harford road, which is inclosed with a strong defensive masonry wall eight to ten feet high, and commanding the road much better than Fort 9, which is masked by a large brick house, and thence by Forts 9 1/2, Worthington, 13 and Marshall, 14, to the bay, additional batteries being interpolated between 9 1/2 and 13, and 13 and 14, which are too distant for mutual support.

Though such a line with continuous rifle-pits would have considerable strength, it does not adequately protect Baltimore, particularly the section between Jones' Falls and Bel Air road, where, from the broken character of the ground, the forts have a limited range of fire, and would be commanded by a high ridge, less than a mile distant, which the enemy would occupy in force without hindrance. So far as we could discover from our rapid reconnaissance, the true line of defense for Baltimore would be, from the head of Ridgely's Cove, following the general course indicated by the blue line on the

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*Map that accompanied original report not found.

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