which they could rally in time to oppose successfully the army under Major-General Halleck in the attempt to open the Mississippi and possess ourselves of east Tennessee. To accomplish the latter purpose, General Buell, in command of what has since been known as the Army of the Ohio, was sent in the direction of Chattanooga, with instructions to seize that place and through it East Tennessee. It has been proved on the part of the Government and not denied by the defense that the rebels were not in force at that time in either place, and had General Buell pushed on he would have taken the more important strategic points almost without resistance. Why this was not done General Buell assures us, as I gather from the character of evidence introduced and the direction of the examination, was owing to a lack of supplies and the attempt to repair and keep open long lines of railway through a hostile population which lines it seems were continually being cut by rebel cavalry and by the inhabitants, organized into guerrilla bands for that purpose.

This explanation or defense the Government claims is not satisfactory. The lack of supplies cannot justify a delay of a month or six weeks for repairs when that time would have enabled the army to seize and occupy a country rich as was East Tennessee, and inhabited by a friendly, loyal population. Raids on lines of communication with outrages of a disloyal people would have ceased with the necessity that caused them. They were inaugurated and continued for the purpose of embarrassing the expedition into East Tennessee. They would have ended with its occupancy.

But the most extraordinary fact pressing in this connection upon the Commission is that the commander of the Army of the Ohio knew at the time that these lines would be useless for the lack of rolling stock, and although an attempt is made evidently to shield himself under the orders of Major-General Halleck, we find no earnest remonstrance that would justify this Commission in regarding such a defense as sufficient. The brief oral instructions claimed to have been received, followed by the yet briefer telegrams, evince a confidence in an a discretionary power given to Major-General Buell which should now bar any attempt at shifting the responsibility. The fact that he knew at the time the hopelessness and absurdity of these efforts is conclusive. If the army had supplies enough to justify the long delay for the purpose of reconstructing lines, which were cut almost as rapidly as they were connected, I hold that he had sufficient to seize and hold East Tennessee, and the better way to get Morgan and Forrest from his rear was to keep them busy at his front. The defenseless state of Chattanooga and East Tennessee would have called for every available rebel soldier, and General Buell's regiment of engineers could have repaired the roads unmolested.

While Major-General Buell was thus engaged the enemy had not only time to strengthen their exposed points but to elaborate the invasion, which changed our operations from offensive to defensive, and eventually forced the army from Battle Creek back to its base at Louisville.

Some time in the first part of August General Bragg crossed the Tennessee at Chattanooga with about 30,000 men. At that time General Buell had his lines extended some 40 miles. The returns found at headquarters (Nashville) give us effective men present for duty 50,000 as the Army of the Ohio, and of these 47,500 were south of the Cumberland, and, the Government claims, could have been massed so as to have forced Bragg to a fight before he left Tennessee.