the fact that while our lines were successfully cut our supplies would not justify extended operations. The defense is not tenable. The defense shows us that the Army of the Ohio had twenty day's rations; this, on half on, made forty days, and in less than forty days the campaign in Kentucky and Tennessee was at an end. Butt in addition to this we learn that the line of railway from Nashville to McMinnville was in operation, and that from Louisville to Nashville could have been opened in two weeks, with the exception of that through the burnt tunnels, which left a wagon road of about 20 miles.

THE INTENT.

General Buell made no effort to mass his army and meet Bragg, but fell back to Nashville. It is believed on the part of the Government that a key to this extraordinary conduct may be found in the fact that, threatened as he was in front by Bragg and in rear by Kirby Smith, with his supplies limited and his communications cut, General Buell deemed it necessary to abandon both Tennessee and Kentucky and continue or rather renew the contest on the banks of the Ohio. He certainly did fall back upon Nashville for the purpose of defending that place. Had he believed Nashville threatened from its front McMinnville or Sparta would have been the point to concentrate for its defense. But the Government has shown that this could not have been Bragg's intent, and that General buell had every reason to know it at the time. Bragg's objective when he crossed at Chattanooga must have been Bowling Green. The possession of Bowling Green gave him Nashville, while at the same time he was marching in the direction of his supplies. General Buell by massing his forces at some point on the Cumberland, Lebanon for example, could have disputed the crossing of the river and at the same time have carried Nashville. Had Bragg attempted to avoid him by crossing farther up he would have been thrown upon a country so destitute of subsistence that his march must have proved disastrous.

As to General Buell's intention, however, we are not left in doubt. That he fell back to Nashville to gather up his supplies and then evacuate prove. But in addition to this we have the testimony of Governor Andrew Johnson as to what General Buell actually said.

Before calling attention to this deposition it is well to consider, however, the significance of the defense in relation to it. Long such a charge was ever dreamed of General Buell had strengthened his case in response to it. As if conscious of something that might come up, he has indicated the charge by a defense in advance. But Governor Johnson says positively that General Buell informed him that he considered Nashville of no importance in a military point of view, and it would have been evacuated three months before had his advice been followed. The he became alarmed evidently at the attitude of Governor Johnson, and said subsequently to Generals Thomas and McCook that Nashville must be held at all hazard is true; but he never changed his intention. And it will be observed that he takes and uses up Governor Johnson's opinion when he says the the place should be preserved on account of its political importance.

This evidence of Governor Johnson's is further sustained by a telegram from General Halleck, which was found lying loose and unrecorded at the Department Headquarters, General Buell informing me in open court at the time I presented it to him that he knew nothing of it, while

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