Owing to the delay in procuring sufficient transportation for the expedition to East Tennessee i had regarded the campaign against Nashville as the one which it would be necessary to enter upon first in order to save time. I was waiting for the arrangement of the necessary concert between the forces on the Mississippi and my own to commence it, when, owing to the illness of the general-in-chief, and at the request of the President, I wrote on the 3rd of January to Major-General Halleck, who was in command in Missouri, and proposed substantially the same plan I had submitted to the general-in-chief, and substantially the same as that which afterwards resulted in the capture of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Nashville. It contemplated an advance upon Nashville through Kentucky, a strong demonstration, which might be converted into a real attack, against Columbus, if the enemy should weaken that point to strengthen others that were threatened, and an advance of 20,000 men up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers under the protection of gunboats. Such a force I deemed sufficient at that time, for the works at Forts Henry and Donelson had as yet no great strength and were but feebly armed and garrisoned. If the expeditions should be threatened by a superior force they were to unite, under the protection of the gunboats, and make themselves secure until released by my advance upon Nashville. At that time I expected that the expedition already commenced against the enemy at Mill Springs would be fully accomplished in ten days and General Thomas' troops in a position to be available for other service.

General halleck replied to my proposition that he had not spare force enough to undertake it, and suggested the objection that the proposed operation was one upon outer lines, but he offered to make a demonstration from Paducah toward Columbus. these facts explain in part why I was not prepared to act as promptly as I could otherwise have done when General Halleck subsequently commenced his advance up the Tennessee River. He stated also that he hoped in a few weeks to be able to render me material assistance. A mere demonstration, not in sufficient force to take a decided part in the campaign, would have been of no avail, because either my advance must be rapid directly against Nashville by flanking Bowling Green-an essential condition of which would be that I should meet supplies transported up the Cumberland-or else it must be deliberate, and with heavy artillery, against Bowling Green, strengthened as that position was by fortifications on both sides of Barren River, and I had not then the means necessary for such an operation. Besides, I received about the same time communications from the President and the general-in-chief urging the expedition to East Tennessee as of primary importance. I therefore gave my attention to it, intending to start that expedition from Somerset with the troops that were moving against the enemy at Mill Springs. The preparation of transportation was urged forward, and a strong force was set to work to corduroy the road to render it practicable. Never the less it was barely possible to subsist the 10,000 men at Somerset. The experiment demonstrated the impracticability of sending an expedition to East Tennessee in such force as to insure success in the present condition, of the roads and on the 1st of February I so advised the general-in-chief in a letter, with full explanations, and expressed my purpose to proceed against Bowling Green.

I had had no communication with General Halleck since his reply to my letter of the 3rd of January, but on the 30th I received a dispatch from him, saying, without giving particulars, that he had ordered an expedition against Fort Henry. The same day I had suggested to him