shows that the signal corps was in operation, and that signal stations had been established to communicate intelligence from different parts of the line to my headquarters. What further precautions could be required except the presence of commanders, whose duty to communicate with me was as well understood as though it had been prescribed in their commissions?

The evidence shows that Gilbert's corps was not "unengaged." It lost nearly 1,000 men that day, which proves that the "whole force of the enemy" was not "flung upon McCook." It is not a very ingenuous representation of the matter to assert what could have been accomplished "if Crittenden's corps had been vigorously pushed forward," when all mention of the fact is omitted that ordered to that effect were given as soon as I was advised of the attack on McCook and that they could not be executed because of the lateness of the hour.

"PERMITTING THE REBELS TO ESCAPE WITHOUT LOSS FROM KENTUCKYJanuary

The same misconception and errors of statement run through the report of the Commission under this head as under the preceding one. It is right in one admission, that-

it cannot be said that the rebel escaped without loss from Kentucky.

The evidence does not justify the statement in any proper sense that-

the morning after the battle it was very early discovered that Bragg had retreated from the position near Perryville.

On the contrary, the fact was not ascertained until about 10.30 o'clock, between which time and the early morning my army was moving to attack; the opinion being general that the enemy would be found near Perryville and the battle renewed that morning. The evidence shows this conclusively, though it also shows that some of the most advanced troops discovered very early that the portion of the enemy which they could see was moving from the position which it held the previous night; but even that did not come to the knowledge of the corps commanders nor to my knowledge. There is no evidence to justify the broad statement nor is it substantially true that Bragg-

left all his sick and wounded and some artillery at Harrodsburg, and being joined by Kirby Smith, hastened across Dick's River-

and that that part of the movement-

from Perryville to the river was confused and disordered.

Still less is it proven or true that any portion of the statement was known by me or by my army at the time. On the contrary, it is shown that the advance of my cavalry toward Harrodsburg on the 9th was effectually resisted, and that on the morning of the 10th Kirby Smith's forces, and probably a large portion of Bragg's army proper, were actually in line of battle 2 miles south of the town. This fact justified the presumption that his whole force was there, and I have now no doubt that the whole of it would have been there in case of battle.

I have never called my movement to Harrodsburg nor from there to Danville "a pursuit." I meant and have described it as a movement to find and give battle to the rebel army. The pursuit I have described as commencing at Danville on the 13th, when the retreat from Camp Dick Robinson was first discovered.

The comments of the Commission on the retreat of the enemy would