brigade of my division, which marched from Tullahoma. I sent couriers when on top of the mountain to Altamont. They returned and reported General Thomas had been there with about 600 cavalry, but had left. An order reached me at Pelham from General Buell that in case I had not descended the mountain to encamp at a place where Battle Creek road intersected the road which led from Tracy City down to Cowan.

I went into camp at Pelham and assumed command of all the troops there. Was there visited by General Buell in person, who ordered me to move with my own (Second) division up to Altamont. I remained there until I exhausted all forage and water, and then descended the mountain by Hickory Creek road and encamped at Hubbard's Cove. Our army had been on one-half rations for a month, except what the men had provided for themselves, such as green corn and fresh meat. Our supply of salt was very small. I will state General Buell sent me a synopsis of his plan of campaign while at Battle Creek, which was to attack the enemy as they debouched into the Sequatchie Valley and as he descended into the plains of Tennessee from the Cumberland Mountains, which was as perfectly planned as could be. This plan could not be carried out for want of supplies. The railroad was constantly kept cut, and my impression then was that we had but twenty days' rations for our army in Tennessee.

After reaching my camp in Hubbard's Cove, on Hickory Creek, I there received General Buell's plan of concentrating his army at Murfreesborough and my instruction what to do. This plan of concentration, in my opinion, was as perfect as it possibly could be. I then marched on Murfreesborough; had entire control of the rear of the army until I reached the city of Nashville.

The enemy in their movements could have but two objectives-Nashville and Kentucky. I considered a march to Kentucky a hazardous one for them, and, in case we were to fight in Tennessee, Murfreesborough or Nashville were the points we could concentrate at. By coming to Nashville, by assistance of troops from the Army of the Mississippi, we could place about 15,000 more men in line to fight than we could at Murfreesborough.

I was never satisfied with the manner in which General Buell's army was scattered along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. But I believe others, higher in authority, are responsible for that altogether. I was never told so by General Buell, but still that was my impression.

General Buell has been censured by the public press for not arriving at the battle of Shiloh sooner. I commanded his advance, and had communication with General Grant, who was at Savannah. I built the bridges over Duck River. I don't believe he could have gotten his troops to the battle of Shiloh sooner without abandoning his transportation. Duck River was not fordable for 50 miles either way, there being 40 feet of water in it. A notification was also received from General Nelson stating we would not be needed before Tuesday. There was no information that warranted any rapid marches. I supposed General Buell's army was to co-operate in an offensive campaign, and that Savannah was the point to concentrate upon.

I do not remember the day I arrived in Nashville, with rear of General Buell's army, from Murfreesborough. I arrived at Mill Creek, 2 1/2 miles from Nashville, with 750 wagons, about 3,000 cavalry, and my own division, at 11 o'clock at night; made the march in one day, 30 miles. I reported in person to General Buell that night about 12 o'clock. I returned to my camp that night; received an order early next morning to be ready to march. I was on the march and received an order, countermanding the former, to encamp at McEwing's house, about 11 miles from here, with my own old division. I remained here that day and until 5 o'clock on the evening of the next day.

During my stay that time near Nashville I visited General Buell some two or three times. On one occasion he asked me about how many men it would take to defend Nashville. I replied about 20,000 men. I believe he asked me if I thought 20,000 men would hold it. I told him I did not consider it a very defensible place. At that time I thought Price's army was marching into Middle Tennessee. I advised General Buell to abandon the place and to allow me to burn it. He replied Nashville must be held at all hazards, and was very glad he did not select me to defend it. My reasons for advising General Buell to burn Nashville, I believe it to be the most treasonable place in the Southern country, except the little place of Murfreesborough. I was in General Buell's quarters on the evening of the second day I arrived here, when he received a dispatch from General Jacob Ammen that his outpost at Edgefield Junction was in the presence of the advance of the enemy. General Buell then ordered me to proceed immediately to his assistance with my division. I reached Edgefield Junction about 2 o'clock in the morning. Ammen's division was ordered to move forward that morning on the road to Bowling Green. I was there joined that morning by General Buell and staff. General Buell then marched that morning with my division toward Bowling Green. We left that camp at 12 o'clock the same day we arrived and marched to Tyree Springs. The next march we made was within