The PRESIDENT. I can assure General Buell that nothing is done to his prejudice inconsistent with law.

General BUELL. I do not wish to inquire into anything that properly belongs to the Commission in secret session, but if the persecution introduces arguments upon my objections I claim that I ought to be privileged to hear them and I think they should be recorded. I wish to inquire if that rule is being observed.

The court was then cleared, and the Commission affirmed the reply and the assurance of the president.

General STEEDMAN. The opinion of officers of our army who interested themselves in obtaining information as to the strength of the enemy, so far as I became acquainted with their opinions, fixed Bragg's strength at from 25,000 to 35,000 after his army emerged from the Sequatchie Valley at or near Pikeville. The largest estimate I ever heard made by those who pretended to know about the strength of the enemy was made here at the quarters of General Schopf by a young man who professed to be in the employ of the Federal officers; whether he was or not I am unable positively to state. I know, however, he communicated with my superior officer on the subject; fixed Bragg's strength at between 37,000 and 38,00, exclusive of artillery; 27 brigades - 9 division of 3 brigades each. The strength of their regiments was estimated at 350, making about 37,800. The strength of Bragg's army was a matter of discussion very frequently among the officers of our army at various points on the march when they had an opportunity to meet to discuss these things. I heard a great deal of discussion about it near Cave City. The impression was very firmly fixed upon my mind from opinions expressed by officers generally with whom I talked on the subject that the strength of the Confederate army was in the neighborhood of 35,000.

Question. Aside from any reliable information, would not the opinions of intelligent officers be very much influenced as to the number of Bragg's army be the fact that he threw an army from Chattanooga into Kentucky in the face of General Buell's forces, which was a bold undertaking and requiring a large army?

It would make the impression, perhaps, upon the minds of officers and anybody who thought upon the subject that the enemy was larger than it really was; at least I would add that it would make the impression upon the minds of the officers generally that the army was a very large one.

By the JUDGE-ADVOCATE:

Question. You will state, if you please, whether you accompanied the march from Nashville to Munfordville, what you know of the surrender of that place, and the failure on the part of General Buell's army of to relieve it.

I accompanied the march of the rear division from Nashville to Bowling Green. I know nothing of the surrender of Munfordville, except what I read in the newspapers and heard from the paroled officers and soldiers on their march from Munfordville to Bowling Green. That our army failed to reach there in time to prevent the capture of the garrison I know, but whether General Buell was responsible for it or not I do not know. The advance of the army was at Bowling Green some time before my division reached there.

Question. I would ask you, general, what time the rear division reached Bowling Green?

I think it was on Wednesday, September 17, but I do not undertake to be positive. I think also that was the day of the surrender of Munfordville.

Question. Had the enemy made a stand at Munfordville would General Buell's army have been forced to fight? Could you have avoided a battle there?

General Buell's army would have fought had it been permitted to, and my impression is that we would have had to fight.

Question. What, in your opinion, would have been the effect of a defeat of our army at Munfordville upon our fortunes in Kentucky and Tennessee?

I have never thought of that.