Sequatchie Valley. He represented that the main body of the army on this side of the mountain. They were going, the thought, in the direction of McMinnville, and represented them to be on the plain, about 8 or 10 miles from what he called the foot of the ridge.

Question. You say he was one of General McCook's scouts?

He so represented himself, I stated; and we were satisfied from his statements and the papers he had on his person that this representations were correct.

Question. Do you know if he reported his information to General McCook?

I do not.

Question. Do you suppose that the impression which prevailed in the army as to the strength of Bragg's army may have been influenced by a knowledge of our own strength and by the natural desire of troops to engage an enemy, and thence convincing themselves that the enemy did not much, if any, exceed them in strength?

It is possible that the general disposition of the troops to underrate the strength of an enemy may have influenced the opinion of our army as to the strength of the enemy, though I do not know that it did.

Question. Do you not think that men anxious to meet an enemy would be more likely to underrate than overrate their strength?

I think it is the general disposition of men to underrate and adversary.

Question. I will speak now of your own opinion in regard to the propierty or expediency of moving upon Nashville. You have stated in your testimony that you thought the enemy might have been met and driven back at some point beyond McMinnville. Are you well enough acquainted with the country and the road now to be able to pronounce a deliberate judgment in regard to the expediency of such operations against the enemy?

I stated in my direct examination that I knew very little about the topography of the country between McMinnville and the mountains or the facilities for getting water at the time, but that my understanding was that it was very difficult to get water for any considerable number of troops. I also stated that it was the opinion of the officers of the army that the enemy ought to have been met at or near McMinnville. I know but little about the character of the roads, nothing except of those I saw and of which I heard representations from such scouts as I conversed with; but, with the limited experience I have in the matter of war, I think our army was able to whip Bragg's at any place between the mountains and Kentucky. That was may belief at the time and nothing has occurred since to change that opinion. I thought then and think now that General Buell's forces were equal, if not superior, to Bragg's. Without pretending to give any opinion as to strategy, I believe our army was able to whip the rebel army any day after it crossed the mountains. The army left so, and the confidence of the army in its ability to meet Bragg would have given it success.

Question. Do you know what available forces could have been concentrated about McMinnville?

I suppose that General Beull could had concentrated 40,000 men at McMinnville.

Question. Do you know anything of the circumstances which would necessarily have controlled the movements of my army in that country at that time, such as the amount of supplies particularly?

Of course I have no official information as to the number of rations at the disposal of General Buell at points between Nashville and Huntsville or Nashville and Dechered, along the line of the road, that were available; but I am confident that,for the short time that it would have been necessary to subsist the army anywhere in Tennessee to have whipped Bragg the army could have lived on the country.

Question. In what way could you manage to subsist an army from that country while it was engaged in actual operations?

I would draw the supplies for the support of the army through the same officers