Buell's army could have attacked Bragg's army with a prospect of success?

I think it might have been done after General Bragg crossed the Cumberland River, by a rapid concentration of the Army of the Ohio on the line that he was pursuing into Kentucky by the way of Glasgow. As is known, there is a turnpike road leading from this city to Gallatin and from there into Kentucky by the way of Scottsville and Glasgow. On the evening of the 6th of September I received an order from General Buell to commence crossing the Cumberland River with my division at daylight next morning and after the division had crossed to report to him in person. I did so. He then instructed me to march my division as far as what is called the Edgefield Junction, there to leave all the baggage in charge of the quartermaster, and take wagons enough to transport six days' rations for the troops and cooking utensils for the men. After making this arrangement to move with my division promptly in the direction of Gallatin, it was furthermore stated that it would be followed up by other divisions of the army on the same road; that he would probably be up at Gallatin the next morning by the time I got there. He also charged me to be very alert and gain all the information of the movement to move with my division promptly in the direction of Gallatin, if was furthermore stated that it would be followed up by other divisions of the army on the same road; that he would probably be up at Gallatin the next morning by the time I got there. He also charged me to be very alert and gain all the information of the movements of the enemy that was possible. By following out what seemed to be General Buell's plan, so far as I could infer it would have been possible to have concentrated his army at Glasgow before General Bragg. concentrated his army there. It was not known at that time certainly, but only believed, that Bragg had crossed the Cumberland River. I certainly did not know anything of it, though I did shortly afterward.

Question. What was the practicability of General Buell's army re-enforcing Munfordville previous to its being attacked by Bragg?

I think that while it might have been a hazardous movement to the Army of the Ohio in some respects, it could have been done.

Question. What would have been the effect of a stand being made by the rebel army of 50,000 or 60,000 men at Munfordville upon the Army of the Ohio?

It would have been very dangerous for the Army of the Ohio to have attacked 50,000 or 60,000 men at Munfordville. According to the best of my recollection, and I think I gained my information from entirely reliable sources, I do not think the Army of the Ohio could have been brought to attack at Munfordville from 42,000 to 45,000 men. The position which an enemy of any intelligence would have occupied for a battle in that vicinity is not at the town of Munfordville, but about 2 miles south of Green River. The position consists of a very strong, rocky, woody, ridge, stretching nearly at right angles with the line of approach by which the attacking forces would have been compelled to advance, and my opinion is that that position would have five the party holding it an advantage of at least 10,000 men. It is true, in my opinion, that the position might be turned by the right if the forces attacking it form the southern side. It would not have been absolutely necessary to attack the rebels in this position. There is a road across the country, broken and bad, but, from my knowledge of the country, barely practicable, from Bowling Green, by the way of Brownsville, Litchfield, &c., to Elizabethtown and Louisville.

Question. What would have been the effect of such a movement upon Bowling Green and Nashville?

To some extent certainly it would have uncovered both places and left them open to an attack of the enemy.

Question. Can you state how far and well the Army of the Ohio was provided with transportation while at Nashville, before commenced that march toward Kentucky, when the army was concentrated at Nashville?

My own division had an ample supply of transportation, and so far as I know from contact with other divisions they had sufficient transportation. My answer was based upon the impression that the question referred to transportation for that movement. What was sufficient for one movement might not have been sufficient for another.

Question. State whether you accompanied the army in its march from Louisville to Perryville; and, if so, what you know of the movements of the enemy the day subsequent to that battle.

I did accompany the Army of the Ohio in its march from Louisville to Perryville. In the morning of the day following the battle of Chaplin Hills, two brigades of my