nooga, and that they had about 15,000 men in each division. He went into the minutiae, giving names of commanders of divisions and commanders of corps, strength of regiments and strength of companies. His name, I believe, was Thatcher.

Question. According to all the information derived, what estimate did you at that place upon the strength of Bragg's army in crossing the mountains?

My opinion at the time General Bragg's force was crossing the mountains and moving up the Sequatchie Valley, by weighing all the information I had been able to receive, was that it amounted to from 40,000 to 45,000 men. The opinions which I received from my own operations would not have led me to put so high an estimate as that upon the force; but the information obtained through the spy referred to led me to estimate it very much higher than the number I have given; but by comparing all the information, and making allowances and taking the mean between them, I entertained the opinion at that time that the force was about 45,000 men. This does not include Kirby Smith's.

Question. Had you as good an opportunity of acquiring information as to the strength and movement of the enemy as any colonel in your command?

I should think a great deal better.

Question. Did you ever hear the strength of the enemy estimated by any intelligent officer who had peculiar facilities for acquiring information as low as 25,000 men?

I never heard an estimate which places it as low as 25,000 men.

Question. Do you believe now that Bragg entered Kentucky with no more than 25,000 men?

No, sir.

Question. Have you a pretty good knowledge of the country from the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad northwest for a distance, say, of 50 or 60 miles?

A portion of my division, myself with it, was stationed three weeks at Decherd, on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad; subsequently it moved to Manchester; then to Morrison's Station, on the Tullahoma and McMinnville road; then to within 2 miles of McMinnville, This extended from the 20th of July to the 3rd of September. During that time I was deeply interested in knowing as much as possible of the movements of the enemy - by what routes he could approach my own position. This led me to study the maps of the country as far as I could, and to gain all the information I could from the citizens in regard to the various roads through the mountains, more especially from Chattanooga to the various positions occupied by my division.

Question. What might be the various objects of an enemy crossing the Tennessee River near Chattanooga and descending into the Sequatchie Valley, having reference to the country we then occupied?

I suppose there might be a variety of objects. At that time the Army of the Ohio occupied a line extending from Nashville by the way of the Columbia and the Pulaski Railroad to Athens; thence eastward by way of Huntsville to Stevenson and Battle Creek; also troops were posted from Nashville along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and extending eastward as far as McMinnville. It might have been an object of the enemy to cross the mountains from the Sequatchie Valley and attack any of these forces in reserve along the line of the railroad to Athens eastward and crush them and afterward move rapidly on Nashville, or he might have crossed the mountains by the way of Altamont down on to McMinnville and fallen on the force there. The ultimate object of such a movement, I presume, would have been to clear the obstacles out of the way as soon as possible and move on Nashville. The object of such a movement would be Nashville. I cannot see that he would have crossed the mountains to stop at the foot of them.

Question. Could he have had it in view to descend to Sequatchie Valley and attack our forces in North Alabama, supposing that he was in a condition to assume the offensive?