DECEMBER 16, 1862.

Commission met pursuant to adjournment. All the members present; also the judge-advocate and General Buell:

Examination of General T. J. WOOD continued:

By General BUELL:

Question. Did you endeavor to ascend the mountains to Altamont with any portion of your command while you were in that region?

I did.

Question. Please state, then, the practicability of such a movement.

The road by which the ascent was attempted, and in part effected, is a very difficult one. The operations was a slow one, very slow indeed. Two brigades were marched up and one battery, I think, to the summit of the mountains, some 5 or 6 miles from Altamont. The ascent was commenced by another battery, but the operation and necessarily a slow one. No wagons, so far as I can recollect, were taken up the contains at all. While it is what would be called a wagon road, it is a very bad one indeed, but could not be called an entirely impracticable one. The march up the ascent of the two brigades and part of another occupied pretty much one entire day.

Question. Did you understand that that movement was ordered in consequence of the information that the enemy was advancing on Altamont?

That was my impression at the time.

Question. Did you understand that it was a movement in which other corps of the army participated and to have for irs object the concentration of the army at Altamont?

I had no information but to concentrate. I was informed by General Thomas, who was in command in that region of country at the time we were making the movement from McMinnville and that neighborhood toward Altamont, that General McCook and General Shoepf's divisions, according to the best of my recollection, would be concentrated at Altamont, and would probably reach there shortly after it was expected that the two divisions with which I was associated would be there.

Question. Supposing the information in possession of the commanding general to indicate that Bragg was in the act of crossing Walden's Ridge with the purpose of crossing the Cumberland Mountains by the Therman road, what would you think of the expediency and propriety of throwing a force of, say, 5,000 men in front of him on that road with instructions to fall back and unite with the army, forming a junction at altamont, supposing such a junction to be practicable in other respects?

The judiciousness of such an arrangement would depend somewhat upon the distance in advance of Altamont a force of 5,000 men would be placed.

Question. Supposing this force of 5,000 men to be in the Sequatchie Valley and probably within reach of the Anderson road before the advance of the enemy could reach the valley?

I should consider it a very good arrangement for observing the enemy's movements its rear being secured and the line of communication for falling back safe, always understanding, of course, that officers did their duty and never allowed themselves to be surprised in their communications.

Question. Can you state, from observation or official report, of the practicability of maintaining the army at Altamont, considering the want of water and other necessary supplies?

It would have been exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to maintain any considerable force at Altamont for any length of time or even a few days. At the time I was at Altamont water was exceedingly scarce, and the road by which