Information was derived by our scouting parties of their present at various points throughout the country; in fact you could not miss, in going out, hearing of them and their movements. It was my understanding that Nashville was seriously threatened by them. It was reported that they had made their appearance in the vicinity of Nashville, and I never heard the report discredited. I was informed that the people were alarmed for the safely of the place.

Question. Were these movements of the enemy in large or small bodies of both?

From the reports I received the movement were sometimes made in considerable force; at other times in smaller parties. I heard of them moving in bodies of from 1,500 to 2,000; at other times in bodies from 100 to 300. I think perhaps I heard forces estimated as high as 2,500, but I think I never heard a higher estimate places upon a single body.

Question. Had your march to Shelbyville any reference to these movements?

So I understood it and such were my instructions. It was feared that after taking Murfreesborough the enemy would move westward rapidly and perhaps cut our communication at Columbia, and it was with a view to be in position to prevent such a movement as this that I understood I was ordered to Shelbyville. I might add further, on receiving my orders to go to Shelbyville General buell, who gave them to me in person, thought it might be necessary for me to go on to Murfreesborough; that, however, was to be regulated by circumstances, to be determined when I reached Shelbyville.

The night I passed at Fayetteville, which was the day before arriving at Shelbyville, I heard that the enemy was still at Murfreesborough. It was my intention, and I sent back a report to General Buell that if I should find this report confirmed on arriving at Shelbyville I would move promptly to Murfreesborough, for the purpose of attacking and clearing up any enemy that might be there. On arriving at Shelbyville I learned that the enemy had retreated to McMinnville after the capture of the force at Murfreesborough.

Question. Do you know anything of a simultaneous movement of another force from the vicinity of Athens toward Nashville with reference to the same movement of the enemy upon Murfreesborough and Nashville?

When General Buell gave me my instructions to go to Shelbyville he hold me he had ordered General Nelson to proceed by rail with a force from Athens by way of Nashville to Murfreesborough. That General Nelson did go I was assured by the fact of frequent correspondence and communication with him while I was at Shelbyville and Decherd.

Question. Did the movements of the enemy seem to make these dispositions necessary at that time?

Yes, sir; I think they did. Some such arrangements were necessary to keep open our communications.

Question. Did it appear to you during the months of July and a part of August, before the concentration of the army commenced, that the troops were idle or that they were uselessly employed?

No, sir; it did not occur to me that they were idle or uselessly employed. I speak from the information I received at the time of the service they were performing. I know that many marches were made, and that the troops were generally, as far as my information extended, actively employed.

Question. Will you state, of you please, if you know anything of the condition of the railroads and of the difficulties of transporting supplies from Nashville into North Alabama during the months of July and August?

My opinion and observation combined led me to the conclusion that the two lines of communication by rail by which the troop in Middle Tennessee and Northern alabama was supplied with provisions had been badly injured and torn up by the rebels in their retreat out of Middle Tennessee in the spring of 1862; that it require much labor to put these roads in working order again, and furthermore it required great vigilance and attention to keep them so.