was moving from the Cumberland to Glasgow whether you understood the object of our march at that time.

It is with me a matter of inference what might have been the intention of the commanding general of the Army of the Ohio in that movement. My own impression of the movement itself was that it was to bring about a concentration of the troops at Bowling Green for the defense and fortification of that place against any efforts of the enemy to capture its garrison and its supplies, and, the army being concentrated, subsequently to take e such movements as circumstances and events might indicate as proper.

Question. As we did not attack the enemy at Glasgow, did not Munfordville become as important a point to us as Bowling Green?

General BUELL. I object to that question, inasmuch as it assumes that there was a neglect to attack the enemy at Glasgow, whereas the evidence shows that he could not have been attacked there.

The court is cleared for secret session.

The WITNESS. It is somewhat difficult to weigh with accuracy the relative importance of Munfordville and Bowling Green to us. I can say generally that I consider both places very important; in some respects the elements influencing the question of importance were about identical; and of course it was much to be desired that the enemy should not get possession of Munfordville.

Question. Are not the rules of prudence, caution, and so forth, as applicable to an enemy invading a country and moving in the same direction as the opposing force of superior numbers; and was not the success of the inferior invading army to tube attributed to the wholesale disregard of those rules?

My answer to the first part of the question is, certainly, that all the rules of caution, prudence, watchfulness, &c., are equally applicable to the invading force as to its antagonist. But how far in this particular case the success of the enemy might have been due to the disregard of these rules I am not prepared to give an opinion. Of course a certain degree of audacity combined with a prudent degree of caution will generally lead to favorable results.

Question. Did General Buell give any reason for defending Nashville at the time he left General Thomas in command?

My recollection in that General Buell remarked in the course of his conversation to which I have previously referred that by abandoning Nashville we should almost entirely, if not completely, relinquish our hold on Tennessee; that in case Nashville should be strongly occupied by the enemy and we should be successful in driving the rebel scout of Kentucky, it might and would probably cost us a great deal to retake Nashville, more particularly if the river should not rise at an early day, and especially if the enemy fortify the river should not rise at an early day, and especially if the enemy fortify the river in a way to oppose our ascent in case it did rise. And he furthermore expressed the opinion that the abandonment of Nashville would not only have a bad influence on our cause, more particularly in Tennessee, but throughout the country generally.

Question. Do you remember what gave rise to those remarks on the part of General Buell?

I do not remember distinctly how that particular branch of the subject was introduced, but my best recollection is that the subject came under discussion in considering the difficulties of keeping Nashville supplied with provisions in case we should have along campaign in Kentucky, and also in regard to leaving a sufficient garrison in Nashville for maintaining it with any reasonable degree of security. This latter consideration came up in connection with some conversation as to the probability of an advance from Northern Mississippi of a force under Price, Van Dorn, and Breckinridge, and other rebel leaders, it being reporters in the newspapers and otherwise circulated at that time that such an invasion would be made.

Question. Was this conversation subsequent to the report that General Buell and Governor Johnson had words upon the subject?

It was subsequent to the time that I heard the rumor of such a conversation between General Buell and Governor Johnson. I heard this report when I first reached Nashville, on the 6th of September, which was bout the middle of the day or before. I did not meet General Buell till about 1 o'clock that day or a little later.