We had met with resistance all the way from Louisville and the resistance became stronger and stronger every day. At Bardstown there was quite a skirmish; there was also a skirmish between Bardstown and Springfield as our troops advanced; and there being a very scant supply of water between Springfield and Perryville and a good supply at Perryville, I think that all thought the enemy would take and hold possession of the water and give us battle there.

Question. What, in your judgment, should have been the course of our army immediately following that battle?

I think as soon as we could determine whether the enemy was going to retreat across Dick's River we ought to have marched upon Danville or Lancaster or Stanford, whichever we could have effected.

Question. What would have been the effect, in your opinion, of such a movement?

I think, sir, we should have had, in all probability, another battle, depending entirely upon the good management of our army whether it would have been a complete disaster to the enemy or not.

Question. You can state whether that was your opinion at the time and what suggestions you made upon it.

As well as I can remember now I suggested to General Buell on the evening of the 9th that Crittenden's corps should be advanced as far as Danville; that future movements should depend upon what was developed by that movement.

By General DANA:

Question. Had you posted a portion of your force at Lebanon and the remainder of it at Gallatin while Bragg was approaching Gainesborough was it not at the option of the enemy to avoid you and march toward Munfordville?

Yes, sir.

Question. Why did not General Buell wish to engage Bragg's forces before reaching Bowling Green?

He wished to get his army between Louisville and the enemy and secure his supplies; for, his supplies secured, he could then attack him.

Question. At the time you were at McMinnville what number, from your best recollection, did you estimate the aggregate of Bragg's forces to be?

I never could make out more than 45,000, but the information i received at McMinnville was not very definite. The people who gave me information were generally ignorant and did not know how to estimate numbers. I therefore did not know how to estimate them.

Question. Taking into consideration all the information you then possessed, with what force would you then have felt justified to give battle to Bragg on his descending into the plains of Tennessee?

I think if I could have got 45,000 men at Sparta I would have given battle to him.

Question. Were Bragg's forces materially increased or diminished from that time prior to their reaching Munfordville?

I do not remember to have heard of any additional force joining him. I understood that he was marching by way of Sparta and concentrating his troops as he passed along. My estimate of his forces was based upon what I could learn - what passed through Sparta by the various roads. A force was left to watch his flank and rear and threaten Nashville. I do not think, however, that force was more than 10,000.

Question. In the event of his having been compelled to accept battle on his line of march from the Cumberland to Munfordville was this force within supporting distance?

I think not. I believe that the greater part of it was south of the Cumberland, through I am not positive as to where the whole was.