[CHAP. XXVIII.

Question. In your plan for meeting the enemy at Sparta or thereabouts what force did you suppose he would have and what force did you suppose yourself to have?

My information was that the enemy had 36,000 men. I did not see the reports of our army, but understood we had nearly 50,000 men. I think that would have been sufficient to have met him.

Question. Suppose you could have interposed but 24,000, would you have thought it judicious to interpose yourself in that position when you could have increased the force by taking a position nearer your base?

I do not think so, unless the position taken was of such a strength as to have given us the advantage.

Question. Do you not think that in opposing yourself to an enemy that might choose his route, that might attack you or avoid at his option, it would be necessary for you to have a sufficient force to act on the offensive in order certainly to defeat his purpose?

It might be necessary and it might not; I cannot say. It is a very general sort of a question, and I do not suppose any man can answer it entirely satisfactorily.

Question. If an enemy may pursue various routes you can only put yourself on the defensive with reference to one of them; since while you are preparing yourself on one he may suddenly take advantage of the other and deprive you of the benefit of the position and thus compel you to attack him or let him alone. Perhaps you can answer the question with that explanation more definitely.

If he failed to attack me and I became satisfied that an attack on me would be disastrous I would let him pass. If I felt satisfied that I had an equal chance of securing a victory I should most unquestionably pursue him and attack him wherever I could catch him.

Question. Do you not think that under such circumstances, in order to defeat the purpose of your enemy, you ought to have a sufficient force to assume the offensive; that is, to pursue and attack him wherever you find him, notwithstanding some advantage of position he may have?

Of course it would be necessary to pursue him if you wished to attack him. It would not be advisable to attack 20,000 with 50,000 or 40,000 with 10,000.

Question. Would it always be advisable to attack 10,000 with 10,000 or 10,000 with 15,000?

Not always, sir. There are many instances in which it would be advisable and many in which it would not be advisable. I do not know, however, that this was an instance in which it would not be advisable.

Question. Has your condemnation of the campaign in Tennessee last summer been based on the supposition that we had an army of 50,000 or nearly that, which could be brought to bear upon any point, which could have been opposed to Bragg's army as it passed through the State?

I so understood it, sir; that when our army was concentrated-I mean that army with which General Buell left Corinth-we had something near 50,000 men, and perhaps more.

Question. Can you not see why Murfreesborough might have had some advantage over a more remote point for concentration and battle, supposing the enemy wished to advance upon you? Did the fact of its being nearer your base give it any advantage?

I had very little opportunity of examining the ground, and cannot say certainly that the advantage of Murfreesborough were greatly superior to those of other points. I had not objection to concentrating the forces there, under the idea that Bragg was moving on that point. I thought we could fight there as well as anywhere else in an