attribute them to the forces of the enemy. I judge, however, that they generally acted in concert with some forces present or in the vicinity.

Question. Up to what time were the trains running from Louisville to Bowling Green?

I cannot answer. The fact that communication was interrupted from Bowling Green here prevents absolute knowledge of that fact.

Question. What force, in your opinion, would have been requisite to have kept the railroad open from Bowling Green to Nashville?

To have kept it open beyond peradventure I think that not less than from 10,000 to 12,000 men would have been necessary.

Question. How is it necessary to distribute 10,000 to 12,000 men along that road to keep it open?

Well, I do not know how I could definitely state where the forces should be posted, but I think they should be distributed along the road in such a manner as to be always near any point which might be subject to attack in sufficient force to repel the attack. I take into consideration the disposition of the people, their capacity to injure, and the character of the force that was thrown against it. If this force could be counted on to be expected at any one place they could be met by a similar force, but in order to make this secure for an army it should be such that at any one point sufficient force could be had to meet an attack.

Question. Can you designate the points along the road where it would be necessary to have a force stationed?

The first principle would be to have them distributed with reasonable equality; then, in regard to the selection of places, I would have a force between Goodlettsville and Gallatin, between Mitchellsville and Gallatin two forces, and between Franklin and Bowling Green. When I say these places I do not mean the towns, but at such works in the vicinity as are peculiarly important in relation to the country roads in the vicinity.

Question. What forces would you station at Goodlettsville?

I am not prepared to answer that question as to the exact disposition of these forces at the various points. If I were obliged to do the work it would be with the topography of the country before me and such information as I could collect for doing it.

Question. Why, then, do you say it would require from 10,000 to 12,000 to keep that road open?

The answer was given on the general idea of the exposure of the road and the necessity for defending all points.

Question. Is it customary in guarding a road to place a guard at any other points than to take care of the tunnels and bridges and the road?

That question depends, of course, upon the amount of force there to spare for the purpose; such a force as could be no doubt would be disposed of at the most vulnerable points.

Question. Has it not been the practice to guard railroad bridges and tunnels from the fact that to destroy the one is a serious injury to the road, the other a permanent one, while the track is easily and quickly relaid?

Yes, sir.

Question. The largest force you mentioned as numbering 700 cavalry; how many infantry at any one point would you think necessary to repel an attack of 700 cavalry?

This number of cavalry mentioned was referring to the attack that was made previous to the entrance of General Rosecrans' army; a larger force was assembled at the time of the battle with General Johnson. The question resolves itself into the character and circumstances of the attack. If a regular advance is made upon a particular point of road a regiment of infantry would repel them; but as the attack may be made unexpectedly and at unexpected points, the force necessary to repel them would be indefinite.