on one occasion in burning the bridges on each side of one of the trains that was bringing up troops.

At the beginning of September I withdrew my forces, by the order of General Buell, from the line of railroad. They were concentrated at Nashville. I took command of the forces at Nashville on the 14th of September. General Thomas was left in command of the post, with three divisions that General Buell left-his own division, General Palmer's division of the Army of the Mississippi, and the Eighth Division, which I command. General Thomas, by order of General Buell, marched to Kentucky; took with him his own division, leaving with me two divisions. Shortly after the army had proceeded to Kentucky the unorganized party concentrated their forces in the vicinity of the city, at a place called La Vergne, under the command of Major-General Anderson. About that time General Forrest was sent from Kentucky to take command and organize the detached forces in Tennessee. He brought with him a portion of his own command to do so. He reached Murfreesborough while General Anderson, with over 3,000 men, was at La Vergne. Before he could carry his orders into execution we pursued the forces of General Anderson and captured a number, one of their pieces of artillery, and demoralized their forces entirely. This led to the disbanding of two regiments of cavalry and the withdrawal of General Anderson from that portion of the command. General Forrest then assumed command of all the forces and retained it until General Breckinridge arrived. This was between the 4th and 24th of October. The enemy used every effort to prevent our obtaining supplies and forage. We were without supplies here for fifty days except what we procured from the country. We were obliged to go about 20 miles into the country. The enemy would drive off their catle to some secluded point, which we had to ascertain and then follow them there. They were then concentrating their forces in the neighborhood of Gallatin and Goodlettsville for the purpose of surprising our forage trains, and before we could send out our small force we had to disperse the bands concentrated there. Some ten days previous to the arrival of re-enforcements to General Rosecrans' army General Breckinridge had organized a force in the neighborhood of 25,000 men. Of that force 6,000 were cavalry. He had twenty-eight pieces of artillery, three of which were siege guns. Their advance post was moved to La Vergne, then to the asylum, 8 miles distant, on the Murfreesborough road. From that point they would make sallies on our picket lines and forage parties. They day previous to the arrival of General McCook's command they made an attack upon the east and north side of the defenses at the same time, with the intention of destroying the bridge, I presume. The forces on the north side of the river, numbering 3,000, with two pieces of artillery, were commanded by General Morgan. They had only about 1,500 of those in action. The attack was made about 3 o'clock in the morning. It commenced on the eastern side of the Murfreesborough road, by the enemy, numbering about 3,000, with three pieces of artillery, driving in our pickets. They were speedily driven off without success on the north side. We constructed banquettes along the railroad, which they were only enabled to approach before they were driven back. On the eastern side they fired some fifteen or twenty shots from their artillery. We then opened on them two of the heavy guns at the fort, which obliged them to shift their position. They then moved over to the Franklin road and brought up Hanson's brigade, three batteries of artillery, stationing it between the Nolensville pike and the Murfreesborough pike, on a cross-road which runs diagonally from the asylum to the Franklin road. Their cavalry, about 3,000, with six pieces of artillery, moved down near the Franklin road on the intermediate, which runs parallel with the Franklin dirt road. A small force from this command approached the picket line on the Franklin road. Believing it possible that we could punish that party that came up the Franklin road, I sent a brigade on the Murfreesborough road to cover the real movements on the Franklin road, to engage them apparently on the Murfreesborough road while I took the regiments of infantry and some cavalry, with four pieces of artillery, and preceded the forces on the Franklin road. They retreated, making a stand upon every rising piece of ground, until they reached a distance of 3 miles from the city. I then endeavored to draw them upon our artillery by sending our cavalry forward, with directions to charge upon the rear of the enemy and then retreat, turning into the woods on the right, in hopes of bringing them on an ambuscade. My cavalry were son inexperience that they followed a small portion of the enemy that remained on the Franklin road to within 5 miles of Franklin, and obliged me to move forward with my infantry force 5 miles farther to support them, taking us about 8 miles from the city. Before I could get the cavalry back the enemy had formed in considerable force on my left, with seven pieces of artillery, and we moved up toward the Franklin road to cut off their retreat. I left a regiment of infantry to protect the cavalry, and fell back opposite the position they assumed, and succeeded in placing two guns in position and opening fire simultaneously with their artillery. This enabled me to withdraw my cavalry and get in the rear in time to make preparations for a charge of cavalry which they had formed upon the Franklin road. They shifted three of their guns, and began to move up the reserve toward the Franklin road while trying to get into our rear, at