Army of the Ohio would advance to Louisville about the time of the advance of Bragg's army to Bardstown from Green River?

I have a geographical knowledge of it. I have studied if for my own interest in connection with the movements of the rebel army and your own, but I have never been over it.

Question. Do you know the road by which the Army of the Ohio did advance from Munfordville to Louisville?

Yes, sir; from Munfordville to Elizabethtown; thence to Salt River; thence to Louisville; this is the inner road, nearest to the bank of the river. I sent some cavalry to Elizabethtown, which caused me to inquire into the condition of the road and the nature of the country. I also had something to do with constructing a bridge or ferry, I do not remember which - perhaps both - at this point, to have it in readiness for the crossing of General Buell's army. The distance to Elizabethtown, as near as I remember, is from 45 to 50 miles from Louisville, because we were one day and one night making the march, and there must have been a halt. The cavalry complained of scarcity of water, of the hard road, and the terrible dust and drought. Elizabethtown is about half way between Munfordville and Louisville.

Question. If the strength of the United States force at Louisville and their condition as to effectiveness would have made their defeat almost certain or have very greatly jeopardized them in the event of an attack by the rebel army under Bragg what do you think would have been a judicious disposition of that force, considering that the Army of the Ohio was advancing toward Louisville by the road you have just described?

My advice to General Nelson, and therefore my opinion at the time, was to give an order early in the morning of the day we were speaking of for the evacuation of the place and the crossing of the river (we had on hand some 800 wagons - to load these down with provisions; we had already loaded some steamers to proceed to

Brandenburg with a million and a half of rations), to have all the troops formed and the wagons drawn out at sunset, move down the river in the direction of the Portland pontoon bridge so as to reach in front of it a little after dark; then, instead of crossing the river, to make a forced march by West Point with these wagons and our entire force to Elizabethtown or to such a point as where we should meet the advance of the Army of the Ohio, there to unite with General Buell, distribute our rations to his army, fall upon the rear of Bragg in case he turned toward Louisville, and there destroy him; in case we should drive him up in the angle between the Ohio and Kentucky Rivers, defeat and capture him entirely if possible. That was my opinion and advice at the time, which I notified General Wright and General Buell of as soon as they arrived in Louisville. I believed it to be a certain movement and would have secured the entire rebel army.

Cross-examination by General TYLER:

Question. Was General Wright there at that time?

No, sir; I notified him that I had given this advance as soon as I saw him. I begged Nelson had by talking to him several hours and one time I felt sure he would do it. I felt the movement would be a successful one. The rebels had commenced their deviation in the direction of Bardstown. Our spies at Shepherdsville and in the direction of Lebanon Junction had informed us that they were striking off toward Bardstown. We had some considerable cavalry that I advised should be pushed out on the Shepherdsville and Bardstown roads as a curtain to cover our rear movement. There would have been scarcely any hazard or risk and it would have been impossible for them to have reached us. I was in hopes by this movement to entire Bragg to move directly upon Louisville. Had he done so he would have found nothing in Louisville for his army. We had already shipped everything of value, and (the order not being understood by any one but myself and the commanding generals) he would have found nothing, for the families had all day to remove their valuables. I believe Bragg would have regarded the order as a bona-fide order to evacuate the place and cross the river. In that event I could see no good reason for his not approaching Louisville. At any rate it occurred to me that it would be some days before he would understand the movement and be enabled to develop it, and that would give us time to complete our junction and make such organization as might be necessary, move up by New Haven, and cut him off from any possible retreat in the direction of Harrodsburg or Danville. These are the dispositions and movements I should have made had I been in command. We had planted upon the opposite bank